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ARTICLES

THE EQUIVALENCE OF RELIGION
AND CONSCIENCE
LUCIEN J. DHOOGE*
“Man worships not himself, but his Maker; and the liberty of conscience which he
claims is not the service of himself, but of his God.”1
“If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or
moral in source and content . . . those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that
individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by . . . God’ in traditionally religious
persons.”2
ABSTRACT
This Article examines issues posed by the equation of religious liberty with
secular conscience, utilizing federal law and the law in those states which
have adopted religious freedom restoration acts (RFRAs). The Article initially addresses the definition of religion through an examination of applicable literature and federal and state case law. The same approach is
utilized to define conscience. The Article then examines similarities
between the two concepts and the implications of their equivalence. The
Article concludes that religion and conscience are moral equivalents that
require equal legal treatment. However, equal treatment should proceed
with caution in order to address potential negative consequences.

I. INTRODUCTION
There have been significant recent developments potentially
impacting religious liberty.3 Some of these developments have been
* Sue and John Staton Professor of Law, Scheller College of Business, Georgia
Institute of Technology.
1. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, 65 (Ernest Rhys ed., 1791).
2. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–2605, 2607–08 (2015) (concluding that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry pursuant to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and that there was no lawful
basis upon which states could deny recognition to lawful same-sex marriages performed
in other states); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (holding that privately-owned for-profit business associations possess free exercise rights).
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characterized as inconsistent with such liberty.4 One response has been
the introduction of Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (“RFRAs”) in
legislatures throughout the United States. Although most of these
efforts have failed, twenty-one states currently have RFRAs purporting
to protect the free exercise of religion.5 These efforts and the ensuing
controversy will undoubtedly proliferate in future legislative sessions in
many parts of the country.6
This conflict has been further complicated by federal court opinions equating objections based upon religious liberty with those based
upon secular conscience. For example, in Center for Inquiry, Inc. v.
Marion Circuit Court Clerk, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit overturned Indiana’s marriage-solemnization statute on the
basis that it allowed solemnization by officials designated by certain
religious groups, but prohibited solemnization by equivalent officials of
secular groups.7 More recently, in March for Life v. Burwell, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia granted an exemption to the
so-called “Contraception Mandate” contained within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to a non-profit, non-religious organization
4. For example, three of the four dissenting justices in Obergefell concluded that
same-sex marriage endangered religious liberty. See, e.g.,135 S. Ct. at 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (contending that “people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today” and condemning the majority’s “apparent
assaults on the character of fairminded people”); id. at 2639 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s decision threatens religious liberty with “potentially ruinous consequences”); id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting) (concluding that the majority opinion will
“vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy” who will “risk being
labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools”). See also
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015) (upholding the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s determination that the refusal by a bakery to prepare a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated Colorado’s public accommodation statute);
Elane Photography, v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62–68 (N.M. 2013) (holding that the refusal
of a photography business to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony violated the
New Mexico Human Rights Act).
5. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.–.02 (2016) (effective 1999); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-123-401-407 (2016) (effective 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(a–f) (West
2016) (effective 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01–.05 (West 2016) (effective 1998); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 73-401–404 (West 2016) (effective 2000); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1-99
(2016) (effective 1998); IND. CODE § 34-13-9-.07-11 (2016) (effective 2015); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60-5301–5307 (2016) (effective 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2016)
(effective 2013); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5231–42 (2016) (effective 2010); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-61-1 (West 2016) (effective 2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302.1 (2016) (effective 2004);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-2–5 (2016) (effective 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 251–58
(2016) (effective 2000); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2401–07 (2016) (effective 2002); 42 R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 42-80.1-1–4 (2016) (effective 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10–60 (2016)
(effective 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (West 2016) (effective 2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001–.012 (West 2016) (effective 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 572.02(A)–(F) (2016) (effective 2007). Protection of the free exercise of religion in Alabama is set forth in the state constitution. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01.
6. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that there is “[l]ittle doubt” that efforts to seek religious exemptions from government regulations will proliferate in the context of the federal RFRA); Bruce Ledewitz,
Experimenting with Religious Liberty: The Quasi-Constitutional Status of Religious Exemptions, 6
ELON L. REV. 37, 100 (2014) (predicting that “the demands by religious believers for
exemptions will increase and this will lead to greater conflict with the larger society”).
7. 758 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2014).
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on the basis that its moral opposition was the equivalent of a religious
objection.8
This Article examines issues posed by the equation of religious liberty with secular conscience utilizing federal law and the law in those
states which have adopted RFRAs. The Article initially addresses the
definition of religion through an examination of applicable literature
and federal and state case law. The same approach is utilized to define
conscience. The Article then examines similarities between the two
concepts and the implications of their equivalence. The Article concludes that religion and conscience are moral equivalents that require
equal legal treatment. However, equal treatment should proceed with
caution in order to address potential negative consequences.
II. RELIGION

AND

FEDERAL

AND

STATE RFRAS

A. What is Religion?
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in part,
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”9 Defining what constitutes “religion” can be a difficult task.10 The religious nature of some
belief systems and activities are obvious, but the nature of other types of
beliefs and practices are not readily apparent.11 Any definition risks
excluding some beliefs and practices and is not without controversy.
Given these caveats, one approach is to focus on belief, action, and
purpose.
Belief consists of three components. The first component is faith
which is a belief in “the ‘mission’ of a certain individual or group prophet, incarnate god or church - or assent to a particular interpretation of existence.”12 Beliefs may be illogical, inconsistent, or incomprehensible to others but are “insulated from ordinary standards of
evidence and rational justification . . . employ[ed] in both common
sense and in science.”13 Faith manifests itself in worship and training to
8. 128 F. Supp.3d 116, 132–33 (D.D.C. 2015).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See, e.g., Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)
(stating that defining religious belief and practice are “more often than not a difficult and
delicate task”). See also John O. Hayward, Religious Pretenders in the Courts: Unmasking the
Imposters, 20 TRINITY L. REV. 24, 26–27 (2014) (noting the derivation of the word “religion” from the Latin word religare (“to bind fast”) and rejecting the utility of dictionary
definitions).
11. See, e.g., Donald Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right Require a Narrow Definition of “Religion?” 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357, 367 (2012) (discussing the difficulties
associated with the determination of whether particular practices are “religious” in
nature). But see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 7, 128
(2013) (contending that “[c]ourts almost never have any difficulty in determining
whether something is a religion or not” as they share a “family resemblance” to one
another).
12. Hayward, supra note 10, at 28.
13. BRUCE LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 34 (2013).
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serve this mission and attain individual or group goals.14 The second
component of belief is the desire to belong and become integrated with
a spiritual society which shares the same worldview.15 This desire for
integration may include varying degrees of surrender of individual
autonomy in order to conform to religious precepts.16 The final component of belief is release from daily life, be it the bondage of sin or
human existence.17 This component has been described as “[t]he
desire to escape.”18
Belief is closely related to action and purpose. Belief is manifested
through “categorical demands on action” that require satisfaction
regardless of individual desire or societal incentives and disincentives.19
Beliefs and their implementation through actions serve a purpose, “an
otherworldly order of things.”20 This “order of things” contemplates a
“higher good or ultimate end” beyond ordinary human existence.21
Achievement of these purposes requires consistent striving for personal
transformation by the believer through the exercise of transcendent
power.22 Transformation through the exercise of such power provides
“existential consolation” by rendering the realities of human life, such
as pain, suffering, and death, intelligible and tolerable.23 Such consolation may involve beliefs regarding an afterlife and eternity.24
If these attributes seem somewhat inexact, they are so by design.
Fluidity in defining religion is necessary in order to account for “the
diversity of human experience with what people take to be the divine,
transcendence, or mystery.”25 Such flexibility encompasses the wide
variety of beliefs of so-called “recognized religions,” but also to include
within its definition belief systems that were not traditionally accepted
as religious in nature.26 Such systems include the conventional, the
unconventional, and the controversial.27 Such systems are worthy of
14. Hayward, supra note 10, at 29 (citing ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS
393 (R.C. Zahner, ed. 1997)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. LEITER, supra note 13, at 34.
20. RUSSELL BLACKFORD, FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE SECULAR STATE 6 (Michael
Boylan, ed., 2012).
21. Hayward, supra note 10, at 30. See also BLACKFORD, supra note 20, at 6.
22. Hayward, supra note 10, at 30.
23. LEITER, supra note 13, at 52.
24. See, e.g., BLACKFORD, supra note 20, at 15–20; Hayward, supra note 10, at 30.
25. Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, U. ILL. L. REV. 1457,
1477 (2013).
26. By “recognized religions,” the author means Hinduism, Islam, and those faiths
within the Judeo-Christian tradition. But see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS,
supra note 14, at 393 (defining the “major world religions” to include Judaism, Christianity, Protestantism, Islam, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, Shinto, Confucianism, Taoism, and Sikhism).
27. See, e.g., Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
Church of Wicca is a religion for First Amendment purposes); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the International Society for Krishna Consciousness is a religion for First Amendment purposes);
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protection despite the views of members of the public, in fact, due to
these views, some beliefs are mistaken as “worthless, harmful, weird
delusions.”28
There are hazards associated with such fluidity. New and different
viewpoints regarding imponderable questions should generally be welcomed, but there are costs associated with expansion of religion to
encompass new belief systems. An expanded definition carries with it
the possibility of expanded exemptions from legal obligations binding
upon the community at large.29 The protection of practices that may
be personally burdensome but impose little or no societal cost presents
an easy case for accommodation.30 A more difficult question is
presented by those practices that impose costs and burdens on others.
That the claimant also suffers a personal burden or incurs economic or
reputational costs associated with the practice, although certainly relevant, may be outweighed by the costs and burdens imposed upon
others. Thus, a public provider of a vital service who refuses the
patronage of a member of the community at the very least imposes a
hardship on the prospective patron and possibly a danger to life or
property.31
An expansive definition of religion also creates room for undeserving claimants. Courts unquestionably have the ability to determine the
sincerity of religious beliefs, but it is not an easy task especially given the
U.S. Supreme Court’s limitation upon consideration of the truth or falsity of the belief at issue.32 There is an absence of methods by which to
United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1503–04 (D. Wyo. 1995), aff’d 95 F.3d 1475
(10th Cir. 1996) (presuming all belief systems within the Judeo-Christian tradition, Animism, Bantus, Branch Davidians, Buddhism, Confucianism, Druidism, Hinduism, Islam,
Krishna Consciousness, mythologies associated with Greek, Norse and Roman religions,
Native American faiths, Paganism, Pantheism, Santeria, Satanism, Shintoism, Taoism, the
Unification Church, Wicca, and Zoroastrianism to be religious but excluding anarchism,
humanism, libertarianism, Marxism, nihilism, pacifism, socialism, utopianism, and vegetism as “purely personal, political, ideological, or secular beliefs”); STEVEN K. GREEN, THE
SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 81–118
(2010) (discussing the societal rejection of Deism as a recognized religion in the United
States); Beschle, supra note 11, at 372 (discussing whether Buddhism, Deism, Mormonism, Transcendentalism, and Universalism are sufficiently religious in nature to qualify
for First Amendment protection).
28. Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 626 (2015).
29. See Beschle, supra note 11, at 372.
30. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion,
Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1450
(2012) (utilizing adherence to a kosher diet as an example of religiously-based behavior
that imposes no significant cost upon society).
31. See Lucien J. Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes and Sexual Orientation: Should
There Be a Religious Exemption for Secular Businesses?, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319,
356–58 (2015) (discussing the unworkability of religiously-based exemptions for vital
services).
32. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85–86 (1944) (requiring that sincerity
of religious beliefs be determined “without a view as to [their] truth or falsity”). See also
WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 3 (2005) (questioning the competence and ability of courts to define religion without establishing “a
legal hierarchy of religious orthodoxy”); Beschle, supra note 11, at 372 (noting that
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measure sincerity, even in circumstances where the claimant has suffered a personal burden or economic or reputational costs.33 An
expansive definition may also serve as a means by which to disguise antisocial behavior or illegal activities.34 This circumstance creates the risk
that accommodation of the beliefs of one sincere individual requires
the accommodation of “the angry, revengeful, avaricious, and irreligious feelings of fifty.”35 The possibility of granting religious status to
undeserving claimants who may abuse any accompanying exemptions
may have a chilling effect on future recognition efforts by truly sincere
claimants.36 This reluctance may be exacerbated in circumstances
implicating public health, safety, and welfare.37 Sincerity, deserving
behavior, clear standards for their determination, and careful judicial
review are necessary in order to prevent religious claims from becoming
“the first refuge of scoundrels” searching for a justification for otherwise indefensible conduct.38
Early U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence adhered to traditional
traits in defining religion, especially the existence of and belief in a
supreme being.39 This requirement was relaxed in subsequent deci“[w]hile not impossible to disprove, sincerity is difficult to challenge, especially under the
Ballard injunction”); Wilson, supra note 30, at 1453 (contending that courts have “institutional competence” to determine the sincerity of religious beliefs but that such determinations are difficult given the limitations imposed by Ballard).
33. See Kent Greenawalt, Essay, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 28 J. L. &
POL. 91, 94 (2013) (noting that claims for exemptions rarely involve significant personal
burdens or dire economic or reputational costs).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996) (denying
religious status to the Church of Marijuana whose primary rituals were smoking marijuana and advocating for its legality); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443–44 (D.
D.C. 1968) (holding that groups must not be afforded the protection accorded to the free
exercise of religion “merely by adopting religious nomenclature and cynically using it as a
shield to protect them when participating in antisocial conduct that otherwise stands condemned” and consequently denying religious status to the Neo-American Church whose
principal ritual was the consumption of illegal psychedelic substances such as LSD). See
also Beschle, supra note 11, at 376–77 (discussing claims of religious status by white
supremacist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan).
35. GREEN, supra note 27, at 129 (quoting 2 LYMAN BEECHER, The Building of Waste
Places, in BEECHER’S WORKS 124–26).
36. See Beschle, supra note 11, at 372 (stating that “[e]ven those who are open to
creating exemptions for religious believers may hesitate if they fear that undeserving,
insincere claimants will abuse the exemption. And this fear can be effectively invoked to
oppose the recognition of the exemption itself, even for the sincere.”).
37. See, e.g., Kuch, 288 F. Supp. at 443–44 (holding that “[i]n a complex society
where the requirements of public safety, health and order must be recognized, those who
seek immunity from these requirements on religious grounds must at the very least
demonstrate adherence to ethical standards and a spiritual discipline.”).
38. United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1498 (D. Wyo. 1995).
39. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (holding that religion “has
reference to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose
of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.”); United States v.
MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633–34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (stating that “the
essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation.”).
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sions acknowledging that some belief systems considered to be “religious” in nature do not include belief in the existence of God.40
Further broadening of the definition occurred in the 1960s and
early 1970s. For example, the draft acts adopted in the context of
World Wars I and II and the Vietnam War granted exemptions to members of a pacifist religion or those who objected based upon religious
training and beliefs.41 In United States v. Seeger, the Court equated pacifism based upon conscience-based beliefs with religious training despite
statutory language requiring belief in a “Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation” and excluding “political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code.”42 Thus, an agnostic belief system in which the existence
of a supreme being remained an open question and the adherent’s
words and deeds were motivated by a devotion to goodness and virtue
for their own sake was sufficient to qualify for an exemption from military service as long as such belief system was sincere, meaningful, and
occupied a place in the life of the possessor parallel to that occupied by
belief in God in the life of a religious adherent.43 The effect of the
holding in Seeger “essentially eroded any distinction between religious
and nonreligious claims to conscientious objection.”44
The boundary was further blurred five years later in Welsh v. United
States.45 Welsh’s claim of conscience was not based upon religion at all
but rather derived from history and sociology, grounds specifically
excluded from consideration by the Military Selective Service Act.46
Nevertheless, the Court found the claim of conscience to be “strikingly
similar” to that at issue in Seeger.47 The Court thus held that the exemption covered persons “whose consciences, spurred by deeply held
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace” if
they acted in a contrary manner.48 Deeply and sincerely held beliefs
40. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (finding Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture and Secular Humanism qualify as religions despite the absence of
a belief in God).
41. See, e.g., Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (2016)
(exempting individuals who were opposed to warfare on the basis of “religious training
and belief”); Selective Service Act, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (1940) (repealed 1966) (conditioning exemptions from military service upon “religious training and belief” and excluding objections based upon individual moral codes); Selective Draft Act, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76,
78 (1917) (repealed 1935) (requiring membership in a “well-recognized religious sector
organization” based upon a fundamental belief in pacifism).
42. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965). See also Military Selective
Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j).
43. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166. But see Hayward, supra note 10, at 33 (criticizing the
failure of the Court to provide guidance in determining when an agnostic belief system
occupies a place in the life of the possessor equivalent to that occupied by belief in God
in the life of a religious adherent).
44. Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901, 909
(2010).
45. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion).
46. See Beschle, supra note 11, at 370 (noting that the belief system at issue in Welsh
was “more clearly nontheistic” than the beliefs at issue in Seeger).
47. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335.
48. Id. at 343–44.
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derived from purely ethical or moral sources were entitled to protection if they occupied “a place parallel to that filled by God” in religious
persons.49 The blurring of religious and conscience-based claims continued in the years following Seeger and Welsh.50
B. Religion in the Federal RFRA
Signed by President Clinton on November 16, 1993, the purpose of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (hereinafter “federal RFRA” or
“Act”)51 was to guarantee the application of the compelling interest test
in all cases where the free exercise of religion was substantially burdened even if the burden resulted from a rule of general applicability.52 Persons whose religious exercise was burdened could assert a
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
“appropriate relief.”53 The Act left many questions unanswered within
its text, including what is religion and what constitutes free exercise.
An initial burden for federal RFRA claimants is to demonstrate that
their beliefs are religious.54 Secular philosophical concerns and a
claimant’s purely subjective views with respect to what constitutes relig49. Id. at 340 (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)).
50. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (concluding
sincerity of belief was more important than adherence to or membership in an established religious body in order to qualify for protection); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707, 715–16 (1981) (holding that individual religious beliefs do not need to coincide with
the majority view within a religious denomination in order to qualify for protection). But
see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (overturning a state compulsory education statute as applied to Amish children and further holding that “to have the protection
of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief”).
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–4 (2016). The impetus for the Act was U.S. Supreme
Court opinions restricting free exercise claims in the context of neutral and generally
applicable laws. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 531, 537–39 (1993) (holding that the government need satisfy the compelling
interest test only when reviewing laws targeting specific religious practices); Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (refusing to excuse individuals from compliance
with “a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)”). For criticism of
these decisions, see, e.g., Beschle, supra note 11, at 357 (describing Smith as “an unfortunate decision reflecting insensitivity to the significance of the free exercise right”); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466,
471 (2010) (criticizing the conclusion that “[t]o the extent secular law clashes with religious obligation, religious obligation generally loses”); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of the Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1455
(1990) (arguing that religious liberty is subject to special protection from government
interference); Eric Alan Shumsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Postmortem of a
Failed Statute, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 81, 85 (1999) (describing Smith as a perceived repudiation of established precedent and a threat to religious freedom).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). The Act specifically provided that the “[g]overnment
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, except . . . in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and . . . [if the law] is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Id. § 2000bb-1(a–b).
53. Id. § 2000bb-1(c).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2007).
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ious practices are insufficient.55 Rather, courts interpreting the Act
have defined religion as consisting of five essential elements. These elements are: (1) ultimate ideas regarding life, purpose, death, and other
imponderable issues; (2) metaphysical beliefs that transcend the physical and observable world; (3) a moral and ethical system prescribing a
particular manner of acting or way of life; (4) a comprehensive system
of beliefs; and (5) the accoutrements of religion.56 No single one of
these factors is dispositive, and, if they are minimally satisfied, they
“counsel the inclusion of beliefs within the term ‘religion.’ ”57
The determination of whether religious beliefs are protected by
the federal RFRA also requires inquiry into the claimant’s sincerity.58
Sincerity is a factual determination and does not require a finding that
the beliefs are central to the purported religion, or acceptable, logical,
or comprehensible by others.59 A claimant’s beliefs need not be shared
55. Id. at 853 (holding that the federal RFRA protects practices rooted in religious
belief and not “ ‘purely secular’ philosophical concerns.” (quoting Callahan v. Woods, 658
F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981)). See also United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10th
Cir. 1996) (holding that secular philosophies and ways of living do not qualify as religious
beliefs subject to protection pursuant to the federal RFRA); Guzzi v. Thompson, 470 F.
Supp. 2d 17, 26 (D. Mass. 2007) (concluding that protected practices must be derived
from a belief system rather than a claimant’s “purely subjective and isolated construction”
of what constitutes a religion or religious practice); United States v. Quaintance, 471 F.
Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (D. N.M. 2006) (refusing to extend the federal RFRA to include
secular philosophies and ways of living).
56. See, e.g., Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1483 (denying religious status to the “Church of Marijuana”); Quaintance, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1155–56 (denying religious status to the “Church
of Cognizance”). “Accoutrements of religion” include the existence of a founder,
prophet, or teacher; important writings; gathering places for worship; enlightened individuals who serve as keepers and purveyors of knowledge; ceremonies and rituals; a designated structure or organization; holidays; dietary requirements; guidelines regarding
appearance and clothing; and efforts to propagate the faith to others. See Meyers, 95 F.3d
at 1483; Quaintance, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1164–70. For a pre-RFRA example of judicial
application of these elements, see Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1029–36 (3d Cir.
1981) (holding that maintenance of a raw diet was not connected to a recognizable
religion).
57. Quaintance, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (quoting Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1484).
58. See, e.g., McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 477 (5th Cir.
2014) (holding that “[s]incerity is an inherent issue in a RFRA case”); Zimmerman, 514
F.3d at 853 (remanding an inmate’s claim that providing a blood sample as a condition of
probation violated his religious beliefs); Quaintance, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1155, 1174 (denying protection to claimants “adopting religious nomenclature and cynically using it as a
shield to protect them when participating in antisocial conduct that otherwise stands condemned.” (quoting United States v. Kuch, 288 F.Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968)). For a
pre-RFRA example of judicial inquiry into a professed believer’s religious sincerity, see
Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect “so-called religions which tend to mock established institutions
and are obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity.”).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 682 F.3d 705, 710–11 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that
the district court erred in inquiring into the orthodoxy and sophistication of a claimant’s
beliefs and their fundamentality to a particular religion rather than whether the practices
at issue were rooted in sincerely held religious beliefs); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559,
570 (5th Cir. 2004) (declining to determine the centrality of a practice to a claimant’s
religion as “judges are ill-suited to resolve issues of theology in myriad faiths.”); Bikur
Cholim, Inc. v. Village of Suffern, 664 F. Supp. 2d 267, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that
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by all members of the religion in question in order to merit protection.60 Strict adherence to such beliefs over an extended period of
time also is not required as beliefs may “evolve or change based upon
life experiences or personal revelations.”61
A final question is whether the governmental action in question
interfered with the free exercise of religious belief. “Free exercise” is
broadly defined as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled
by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”62 This definition includes
worship and “most any activity that is tied to a religious group’s mission.”63 However, not all religiously motivated acts qualify for protection.64 For example, religiously-motivated speech is subject to time,
place, and manner restrictions absent evidence that belief compels
adherents to engage in such speech without limitation.65 Furthermore,
as in the case of belief, the activity must be a sincere exercise of
religion.66
C. Religion in State RFRAs
The U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that the federal RFRA was
unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments caused some
states to adopt their own versions of religious freedom restoration
courts may not “judge the merits of various religious practices.”); Guzzi, 470 F. Supp. 2d at
27 (stating that it was not the court’s role to “perform Biblical interpretation.”);
Quaintance, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (determining that the claimants’ beliefs were an insincere attempt to evade prosecution for narcotics trafficking); See also Thomas v. Review Bd.
of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 716 (1981) (holding that a belief can be
religious even if it is not “acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others”
and that courts should not act as “arbiters of scriptural interpretation”); Africa, 662 F.2d at
1030 (concluding that it is “inappropriate for a reviewing court to attempt to assess the
truth or falsity of an announced article of faith. Judges are not oracles of theological
verity, and the Founders did not intend for them to be declarants of religious
orthodoxy.”).
60. See Guzzi, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
61. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d at 853–54.
62. Id. at 853 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). See also Bikur Cholim, Inc., 664
F. Supp. 2d at 275 (further holding that “free exercise” is to be defined “to the maximum
extent permitted.” (quoting Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. Of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338,
347 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Westchester Day Sch. III”)); Guzzi, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 25; Meyer v.
Teslik, 411 F. Supp. 2d 983, 989 (W.D. Wis. 2006); Adkins, 393 F.3d at 567.
63. Bikur Cholim, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d at 288 (quoting Grace United Methodist
Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 663 (10th Cir. 2006). See also Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691, 701 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding
that the free exercise of religion extends “beyond traditional worship services.”).
64. See Mahoney v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 454 F. Supp. 2d 21, 38 (D.D.C. 2006).
65. See id. at 38 (refusing to exempt religious adherents from sidewalk closures and
restrictions at the annual Red Mass in Washington, D.C.). See also Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, 605 F. Supp. 2d 8, 14 (D.D.C. 2009) (refusing to exempt religious adherents from distributing printed materials without a permit at U.S. national parks).
66. See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 663–64
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the denial of a zoning variance to permit the operation of
a day care center by a religious organization did not interfere with a sincere exercise of
religion).
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acts.67 State RFRAs are diverse despite the previously discussed federal
blueprint. This diversity has resulted in numerous unanswered questions in a manner similar to the federal RFRA.
There is little uniformity among state RFRAs with respect to defining protected religious activities. Seventeen states define the exercise
of religion by statute.68 Seven states define the exercise of religion
through reference to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or
religious protections provided in state constitutions.69 Four of these
states, specifically, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia,
have elaborated upon the meaning of these references by statute or
case law.70
Six states share a more detailed definition. In these states, the
“exercise of religion” is defined as “the ability to act or refusal to act in a
manner substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether or not the
exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious
67. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997) (holding that the Act
violated Congress’ power pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment by expanding the coverage of the First Amendment in contravention of the states’ authority to regulate the
welfare of its citizens). See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
68. The term “free exercise” is not defined in the Connecticut, Kentucky, or Rhode
Island statutes, although free exercise has been defined by one Connecticut court as
occurring “in accordance with events that are ceremonial in nature.” See Kubala v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 41 A.3d 351, 365 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011). Arkansas’ RFRA rather meaninglessly defines “exercise of religion” as “religious exercise.” ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-123-403(2) (2016). Kentucky’s RFRA lists governmental actions that burden free exercise such as the withholding of government benefits, the assessment of penalties, and exclusion from programs or access to facilities without defining what is meant
by the “exercise of religion.” See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (2016).
69. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01 (reference to the Alabama Constitution); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 11-61-1(4)(c) (2016) (reference to the U.S. Constitution); OKLA. STAT. tit.
51, § 252(2) (2016) (reference to the U.S. and Oklahoma Constitutions); 71 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2403 (2016) (reference to the Pennsylvania Constitution); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-3220(2) (2016) (reference to the U.S. and South Carolina Constitutions); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 4-1-407(a)(2) (2016) (reference to the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions); VA. CODE
ANN. § 57-2.02(A) (2016) (reference to the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions).
70. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 252(7) (NEED DATES FOR THESE STATUTES)
(prohibiting governmental inhibition and curtailment of “religiously motivated practices”); PA. CONS. STAT. § 2403 (1–4) (prohibiting governmental constraint, inhibition,
curtailment, or denial of expression mandated by a sincerely held religious belief; the
reasonable opportunity to engage in activities which are fundamental to a person’s religion; and governmental compulsion of conduct or expression which violates a specific
tenet of a person’s religious faith); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407(a)(7) (prohibiting governmental inhibition or curtailment of “religiously motivated practices”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 57-2.02(A) (prohibiting governmental inhibition or curtailment of “religiously motivated practices”). See also Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., No. 01-1919, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16397, at *65 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2004) (requiring an actual and imminent interference with a “fundamental tenet” of religion in order to violate the state
RFRA); Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tenn. State Bd. of Equalization, 428 S.W.3d 800,
809, 821 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a church’s operation of “a permanent, fullscale retail business enterprise” seeking customers from the general public did not constitute a religiously motivated practice). Contra Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287, 300
(Tex. 2009) (concluding that Texas’ RFRA guaranteed “an operation which can be and
often is conducted for purely secular purposes [is] entitled to increased protection from
government regulation if conducted for religious reasons”).
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belief.”71 Subsequent case law in Arizona, Idaho, and Illinois has elaborated upon this definition.72 Louisiana’s RFRA includes this language
as well as specific references to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Louisiana Constitution.73 Kansas and Texas also utilize
this definition but qualify it by reference to sincerity of belief.74 Subsequent Texas case law has described the sincerity requirement.75 Sincerity of belief has also been grafted into the Arizona, Florida, and Idaho
RFRAs by case law.76 Finally, New Mexico broadly defines the exercise
of religion to include any “act or a refusal to act that is substantially
motivated by religious belief” without reference to sincerity of belief or
the compulsory or central nature of the purportedly religious activity.77
71. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493(2) (2016); FLA. STAT. § 761.02(3) (2016);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401(2) (2016); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1-5 (2016); IND. CODE
§ 34-13-9-5 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302.2 (2016). Indiana’s RFRA not only prohibits
substantial burdens upon the exercise of religion, but also actions that are “likely” to
result in a substantial burden regardless of whether such actions are engaged in by the
government or a private individual. IND. CODE § 34-13-9-9 (2015).
72. See, e.g., State v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d 1004, 1007 (Ariz. 2009) (interpreting Arizona’s RFRA to require that the action or refusal to act be motivated by a religious belief
in the context of marijuana use); State v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730, 767 (Idaho Ct. App.
2013) (interpreting Idaho’s RFRA to require that the action or refusal to act be motivated
by a religious belief in the context of marijuana use); Marcavage v. City of Chicago, 467 F.
Supp. 2d 823, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (defining the exercise of religion as “conduct or [an]
. . . experience that [a person’s] faith mandates”); Vineyard Christian Fellowship of
Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 986, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (defining
free exercise to include religious observances); Diggs v. Snyder, 775 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ill. Ct.
App. 2002) (defining the exercise of religion as “conduct or [an] . . . experience that [a
person’s] faith mandates”).
73. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5234(5) (2016).
74. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5302(c) (2016) (referencing the U.S. and Kansas Constitutions and requiring that the act or refusal to act be “substantially motivated by a
sincerely-held religious tenet or belief”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 110.001(a)(1) (Vernon 2016) (requiring that the act or refusal to act be “substantially
motivated by sincere religious belief”). Kansas’ RFRA prohibits any direct or indirect
governmental constraint, inhibition, curtailment, or denial of the exercise of sincerely
held religious beliefs and governmental compulsion of any action contrary to such beliefs.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5302(a) (DATE NEEDED).
75. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 80 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that beliefs
“need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others” but cannot be
“bizarre” or “clearly non-religious in motivation”). This determination is to be made on a
case-by-case basis and is highly fact-specific. See Barr, 295 S.W.2d at 301 (addressing the
impact of a zoning ordinance upon a pre-existing faith-based halfway house for recently
released nonviolent offenders). See also A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248,
264 (5th Cir. 2010) (addressing the impact of a school grooming policy prohibiting male
students from wearing long hair on a member of the Lipan Apache tribe); Merced v. City
of Euless, 577 F.3d 578, 588 (5th Cir. 2009) (addressing the impact of local ordinances
prohibiting animal sacrifice upon an adherent to the Santeria religion).
76. See, e.g., Hardesty, 214 P.3d at 1007; Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So.2d
1023, 1034 (Fla. 2004); Freeman v. Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 924
So.2d 48, 56–57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Cordingley, 302 P.3d at 767. See also Romany
Church Ministries, Inc. v. Broward County, 980 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that determinations regarding purported violations of the Florida RFRA
are “inherently fact-specific”); State v. White, 271 P.3d 1217, 1221 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011)
(holding that sincerity is a factual determination).
77. N.M. STAT. § 28-22-2(A) (2016).
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Case law interpreting Idaho’s RFRA addresses the broader question of what is a “bona fide religion.”78 Idaho courts have closely
adhered to the Tenth Circuit’s definition of religion in United States v.
Meyers in undertaking this “difficult and delicate task.”79 In order to be
deemed “religious,” a belief system must address ultimate ideas regarding life, purpose, death, and other imponderable issues.80 These
beliefs must be metaphysical and transcend the physical and observable
world.81 A third requirement is the existence of a moral and ethical
system prescribing a particular manner of acting or way of life.82 The
belief system must also be comprehensive.83 Finally, beliefs must be
accompanied by the accoutrements of religion.84 Courts are not to
consider whether such beliefs are true or false or “acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others,” and all doubts are to be
resolved in favor of a finding of a bona fide religion.85 However, purely
secular philosophical concerns or the melding of teachings from various recognized religions in order to justify otherwise illegal behavior do
not merit protection.86
78. See White, 271 P.3d at 1221, 1225 (requiring a claimant to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide religion which is a question of law).
79. State v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730, 735–38 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013).
80. Id. at 738–39 (citing U.S. v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483 (10th Cir. 1996)). The
Idaho Court of Appeals further described “ultimate ideas” as including questions of:
[L]ife and creation; fear of the unknown; the pain of loss; a sense of alienation;
and the inexplicability of the world; or existential or cosmological concerns,
such as an individual’s existence; his place in the universe; the nature or natural
order of the universe; and the origin, structure, and space-time relationships of
the universe.
Id. at 738 (citing U.S. v. Quaintance, 471 F. Supp.2d 1153, 1157 (D. N.M. 2006)).
81. Id. at 738–39 (citing Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1483). The Idaho Court of Appeals
described metaphysical beliefs as those relating to the existence of “another dimension,
place, mode, or temporality . . . inhabited by spirits, souls, forces, deities, and other sorts
of inchoate or intangible entities.” Id. at 739 (citing Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1483).
82. Id. at 740 (citing Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1483, 1505). Moral and ethical systems
“often describe certain acts in normative terms, such as ‘right and wrong,’ ‘good and evil,’
or ‘just and unjust’ . . . . [and] may create duties—often imposed by some higher power,
force, or spirit—that require the believer to abnegate elemental self-interest.” Id. at 740
(citing Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1483).
83. Id. at 740–41 (citing Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1483). Comprehensive beliefs “provide a
telos, an overreaching array of beliefs that coalesce to provide the believer with answers to
many, if not most, of the problems and concerns that confront humans . . . . [and] generally are not confined to one question or a single teaching.” Id. at 740 (citing Meyers, 95
F.3d at 1483).
84. Id. at 741–44 (citing Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1483–84). “Accoutrements of religion”
include: (1) a founder, deity, prophet or teacher who is considered to be “divine, enlightened, gifted, or blessed”; (2) “seminal, elemental, fundamental, or sacred writings” consisting of “creeds, tenets, precepts, parables, commandments, prayers, scriptures,
catechisms, chants, rites, or mantras”; (3) “sacred, holy, or significant” physical structures
and natural places; (4) “keepers and purveyors of religious knowledge” such as “clergy,
ministers, priests, reverends, monks, shamans, teachers, or sages”; (5) ceremonies, rituals,
liturgy, sacraments, and protocols “prescribed by the religion and . . . imbued with transcendent significance”; (6) a hierarchical organizational structure; (7) holidays; (8) dietary requirements or restrictions; (9) guidelines regarding appearance and clothing; and
(10) propagation of the faith to others. Id. (citing Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1483).
85. Id. at 736.
86. See State v. White, 271 P.3d 1217, 1227 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011).
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The determination of these issues may turn on whether a particular state’s RFRA is to be interpreted utilizing precedent applicable to
the federal RFRA. Only four state RFRAs expressly permit the utilization of federal precedent either statutorily or by applicable case law.87
One state, New Mexico, specifically prohibits the utilization of federal
precedent in interpretation of its RFRA.88 The status of federal precedent in the remaining RFRAs is still to be determined.
III. THE RECOGNITION

AND

PROTECTION

OF

CONSCIENCE

A. What is Conscience?
Creating a workable definition of conscience is as daunting as
defining religion.89 Although by no means an infallible definition, conscience may be defined by its two predominant features: belief and
response.90 Belief refers to individual notions of right and wrong,
which in turn influence decision-making and judgments.91 These
beliefs result in an evaluation of the circumstances of individual actions
wherein the actor “identifies moral principles, assesses context, and
decides whether to do or omit a particular act.”92 Decisions and judgments based upon such evaluations create a moral consciousness for
each individual and provide him or her with a sense of self.93 This
87. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-402(2) (2016) (stating that the act is to be
interpreted “consistent[ly] with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 . . . federal case law, and federal jurisprudence”); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach
County, 14 So.3d 1027, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (applying federal precedent to the
interpretation of Florida’s RFRA); Johnson v. Levy, No. M2009-02596-COA-R3-CV, 2010
WL 119288, at *5–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2010) (applying federal precedent to the
interpretation of Tennessee’s RFRA and holding that it was intended to “mirror” the
federal statute); Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287, 296 (Tex. 2009) (holding that
federal court opinions interpreting the federal RFRA are “germane” to applying Texas’
RFRA).
88. See State v. Bent, 328 P.3d 677, 685 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that differences between the federal and New Mexico RFRAs render any guidance from the federal
statute “misplaced”).
89. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174–75 (1965) (describing the distinction between conscience and religious belief as difficult due to the fact that “in no field of
human endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate”).
90. See Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience?, 76
U. COLO. L. REV. 911, 923 (2005) (contending that conscience “involves more than mere
belief: it entails acting—living—in accordance with central convictions”).
91. See Darlene Fozard Weaver, Conscience: Rightly Formed and Otherwise, 132 COMMONWEAL 10, 11 (2005) (referring to conscience as “human knowledge of right and
wrong . . . our moral consciousness, process of moral decision-making, and settled moral
judgments or decisions”). See also Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1501, 1526–27 (2012) (discussing the impact of perceptions of right and wrong
upon moral decision-making).
92. Sepper, supra note 91, at 1527.
93. Id. at 1528. See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE
OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 79 (2008) (describing conscience as the
“core of [an individual’s] humanity”); Dan W. Brock, Conscientious Refusal by Physicians and
Pharmacists: Who is Obligated to Do What, and Why?, 29 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 187,
189 (2008) (contending that conscience-based judgments “define who, at least morally
speaking, the individual is, what she stands for, what is the central moral core of her
character”).
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“moral consciousness” and “sense of self” are entitled to respect by
others as an affirmation of individual autonomy and personhood.94 A
disconnection between beliefs and decisions, that is, a failure to do
right by one’s conscience, whether compelled or voluntarily, generates
guilt, regret, shame, and a feeling of loss of personal integrity.95
Belief inevitably presents the question of content, specifically, what
types of belief may serve as a motivating factor for acts to be deemed
those of conscience. For example, are acts purportedly based upon
conscience subject to protection only if the motivating belief concerns
ultimate questions such as the meaning of life?96 An affirmative answer
presumes that actors are constantly conscious of such thoughts and
issues in their daily actions and are consistently motivated by them in all
of their responses.97 This is an impossible burden for even the most
mindful of individuals. Such a diminished definition of conscience also
promotes fraud and post hoc rationalizations to the extent that actors
attribute their behavior to thoughts and issues not present at the time
of the responses in question.
An “ultimate issue” requirement also fails to distinguish religion
from conscience.98 Conscience becomes identical to religion to the
extent they are required to address ultimate issues.99 Perhaps the need
for such a distinction is overstated if all belief systems, regardless of
their secular or religious motivations, are entitled to universal toleration.100 But a need for some distinction is nevertheless necessary.
94. See, e.g., Yossi Nehushtan, Secular and Religious Conscientious Exemptions: Between
Tolerance and Equality, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
243, 245 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2008) (describing accommodation of an individual’s
conscience as “always reflect[ing] respect for his autonomy and personhood”); Smith,
supra note 90, at 935 (contending that the most important reason for accommodating
conscience is its centrality to personhood). See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 93, at 79 (contending that recognition of the value of maintaining individual moral integrity compels
people to “value and respect the moral integrity of others”).
95. See Sepper, supra note 91, at 1528. See also MICHAEL G. BAYLOR, ACTION AND
PERSON: CONSCIENCE IN LATE SCHOLASTICISM AND THE YOUNG LUTHER 210 (1977) (stating
that conscience serves as a means by which to judge specific actions and the character of
the persons engaging in such actions); Charles E. Curran, Conscience in the Light of the
Catholic Moral Tradition, in CONSCIENCE: READINGS IN MORAL THEOLOGY 3, 18 (Charles E.
Curran ed., 2004) (discussing guilt and regret associated with failure to follow one’s
conscience).
96. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 93, at 168–69 (describing conscience as involving
the search for the meaning of life).
97. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 905 (noting that “people can have strong
convictions of conscience that bear only a remote relation to their conceptions of ultimate meaning, if they have such conceptions”).
98. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 1476 (noting that “[t]he problem with . . . [an
‘ultimate issue’] definition of conscience is that it is indistinguishable from definitions of
religion”).
99. See id. See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 208–09 (2000) (defining religion to include belief systems that
are “religion-like”).
100. See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 138 (1986)
(contending that “universal toleration must encompass all belief systems, religious and
nonreligious, expressive of our moral powers of rationality and reasonableness”); Chapman, supra note 25, at 1476 (stating that “those for whom ‘life’s ultimate meaning’ is

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-2\NDE201.txt

268

unknown

Seq: 16

13-JUL-17

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

11:15

[Vol. 31

Deeming religion and conscience as identical fails to provide adequate
guidance to courts confronted with issues of application and potential
limitations in any given case.101 More fundamentally, this overlap fails
to “give liberty of conscience any independent role to play in our
scheme of ordered liberties.”102 To this order of thought, conscience
and its exercise are protected because they are similar to religion and
religiously-motivated actions.103 Surely conscience is deserving of protection on account of its own merit. Furthermore, protection of religion and religious acts without protection of their nonreligious
equivalents would be unfair.104
A different question concerns whether claims of conscience should
have a moral basis. For example, an individual may act or refrain from
acting in a given manner based upon a moral obligation perceived to
have general applicability.105 This circumstance does not present a difficult question as conscience-based claims are most commonly perceived as having general applicability.106 Conversely, behaviors based
upon inclinations or predispositions lack the seriousness of purpose to
qualify as acts of conscience.107 However, as one commentator has
noted, inclinations that lack moral content but reflect personal identity
and perceived moral obligations that are not generally applicable present more difficult questions.108 Nevertheless, these difficulties may be
resolved by noting that claims of conscience for which legal protection
is sought almost always involve moral content rather than personal
predilection.109
The identification of principles and assessment of context are crucial to the determination of individual response. “Response” is preferable to “action” as the process of identification and assessment may cause
an individual to choose inaction. In any event, a response is required
since a claim of conscience is a claim “about what one must do, no
religious and those for whom it is based on nonreligious philosophy or morality ought to
enjoy equal liberty to search for that meaning”).
101. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 1477.
102. Id.
103. Id. (contending that equating conscience and religion “fails to give any reason
that nonreligious moral or philosophical beliefs or actions ought to be protected besides
that they are similar, in some unarticulated way, to religious beliefs and actions”).
104. Id. See also Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Isn’t Special?, U. CHI. L.
REV. 1351, 1390–95 (2012).
105. See Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 907.
106. Id. See also ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD:
RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 3 (2010).
107. See Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 907.
108. Id. (citing an individual whose personal identity compels him to be an artist
without underlying moral content and individuals called to specific professions such as
the clergy, medicine, and teaching as examples). Greenawalt notes that “[e]ven if moral
content that relates to other people should be an element of claims of conscience that are
treated as rights, drawing the line in practice between individualized claims of this kind
and those without relevant moral content will be hard.” Id. at 908.
109. Id. at 908. See also LEITER, supra note 13, at 95 (noting that responses based
upon “crass self-interest” are not conscience-based).
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matter what.”110 A conscience-based response is “a kind of moral
imperative central to one’s integrity as a person.”111 There are those
who reject the role of conscience as “a blind dictator” for more voluntarist views based upon the exercise of free will.112 Nevertheless, even a
proponent of free will must admit that conscience provides a “moral
nudge” toward a response appropriate to the individual and consistent
with his or her beliefs.113
This definition of conscience presents the issue of whether an individual response is motivated by conscience. As in the case of religion,
the assertion of a conscience-based response is insufficient without an
accompanying determination of sincerity of belief. But assessment of
“the magnitude of moral convictions is usually extremely difficult.”114
Persons asserting a claim of conscience may not be able to fully articulate the depth of a particular conviction and the importance of that
conviction in their lives or in comparison to other beliefs.115 Furthermore, there is no guarantee that intensive examination of consciencebased responses will result in clear determinations with respect to personal motivations of the actor, sincerity of belief, and establishment of a
hierarchy of convictions.116
These determinations are made easier when an individual has suffered some negative consequence as a result of his or her response,
such as imprisonment, loss of a job or economic opportunity, an
adverse health condition, or public condemnation. The willingness of
an individual to suffer such consequences demonstrates a degree of
sincerity indicative of a conscience-based response.117 This serves to
distinguish such responses from claims in which the individual objects
to a particular set of circumstances but “lacks the moral strength to
adhere to that conviction.”118 The unwillingness to suffer “significant
adverse consequences” casts doubt upon the honesty and depth of an
individual’s convictions.119
However, the vast majority of conscience-based responses will not
result in such dramatic consequences. And yet, in a manner similar to
110. LEITER, supra note 13, at 95. See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 207
(1971) (describing claims of conscience as “binding absolutely” and non-negotiable).
111. LEITER, supra note 13, at 95.
112. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 66 (1996) (describing conscience-based responses as expressions of
individual free will rather than efforts to satisfy obligations beyond oneself).
113. Chapman, supra note 25, at 1476.
114. Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 906.
115. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 1478 (noting that “[s]ome people are remarkably ‘inarticulate’ about their motivation for acts of moral courage”). See also Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
961, 978 n.79 (2010) (discussing the inability of some people to clearly articulate the
motivations for their behavior).
116. Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 906 (questioning the reliability of even “a fairly
intense examination” in distinguishing “genuine claims of conscience from lesser moral
objections”).
117. Id. at 905–06.
118. Id. at 906.
119. Id.
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religion, federal and state courts and legislatures must not only define
conscience but also devise means by which to assess it and determine
whether it is subject to legal protection. It is this necessity that requires
an examination of conscience in federal and state law.
B. Conscience and the Federal Courts
As previously noted, there is historical precedent for granting conscience-based exemptions to specific legal requirements imposed by
federal law.120 Recent lower court decisions continuing this trend are
unsurprising. For example, in Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit
Court Clerk, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned Indiana’s marriage-solemnization statute on the basis that it
allowed solemnization by officials designated by certain religious
groups but prohibited solemnization by equivalent officials of secular
groups.121 The Seventh Circuit concluded that neutrality was “essential
to the validity of an accommodation” regarding religious practices.122
Secular beliefs based upon conscience were entitled to the benefit of
this neutrality principle, and states were prohibited from favoring or
disfavoring religious beliefs vis-à-vis “comparable secular belief systems.”123 “Comparable secular belief systems” are those which “have
moral stances that are equivalent to theistic ones except for non-belief
in God or unwillingness to call themselves religions.”124 To conclude
otherwise is to engage in “forbidden distinctions between religious and
secular beliefs that hold the same place in adherents’ lives” and to permit discrimination among ethical codes.125
More recently, in March for Life v. Burwell, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia granted an exemption to the so-called
“Contraception Mandate” contained within the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act to a non-profit, non-religious organization on the
basis that its moral opposition was the equivalent of a religious objection.126 The Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibited
the government from arbitrarily engaging in different treatment with
respect to alike entities.127 Similarly situated entities were entitled to
120. See supra notes 41–50 and accompanying text. Although this discussion is limited to federal case law, conscience is also protected by federal statutes in limited circumstances. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b–e) (2016) (protecting individuals from
discrimination on the basis of their refusal to perform or assist in the performance of any
lawful health service or research activity, including, but not limited to, abortion and sterilization on the basis of “religious beliefs or moral convictions”).
121. 758 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2014).
122. Id. at 872.
123. Id. at 873.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 873, 874 (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965)).
126. March For Life v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-1149 (RJL), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115483, *22–23 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2015).
127. Id. at *17 (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)).
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similar treatment in the absence of a rational relationship between the
disparate treatment and a legitimate governmental purpose.128
Applying these standards, the issue was not whether secular organizations were identical to their religious counterparts, but rather,
whether they were “similarly situated with regard to the precise attribute selected for accommodation.”129 The “precise attribute” selected
for accommodation in this case was “an employment relationship based
in part on a shared objection to abortifacients.”130 This shared objection was a “moral philosophy about the sanctity of human life” shared
by organizations regardless of their secular or religious affiliation.131
This shared moral philosophy rendered March for Life and previouslyexempted religious organizations identically situated with respect to the
accommodated attribute.132
Granting religious organizations an exemption under such circumstances without a parallel exemption for identically-situated secular
organizations was nothing less than “regulatory favoritism.”133
Although religions were entitled to “special solicitude,” governments
could not favor them at the expense of secular groups possessing
equivalent moral stances with regard to regulated attributes.134 March
for Life’s opposition to the “Contraception Mandate” based upon its
objection to abortifacients and its respect for the sanctity of human life
was deeply held, sincere, and occupied a central place in the organization’s existence parallel to identical beliefs in religious organizations
which had received exemptions.135 Accommodating this moral philosophy only under circumstances where it was “overtly tied to religious
values” swept with “arbitrary and irrational strokes” could not survive
rational basis inquiry.136 The purported distinction thus violated equal
protection.137
C. Conscience in the States
Conscience and its equation to religion have been addressed in
those states that have adopted RFRAs.138 Eight states, specifically, Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
and South Carolina, provide protection for the free exercise of religion
in their constitutions and RFRAs, but have no separate reference to
conscience-based protections. The constitutions in each of these states
128. Id. at *17–18 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
129. Id. at *19 (citing Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 872).
130. Id. at *20.
131. Id. at *21.
132. Id. at *22.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873).
135. Id. (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970)).
136. Id. at 128.
137. Id.
138. For a comprehensive discussion of protections afforded to the free exercise of
religion in state constitutions see Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and
Defenses Under State Constitutions, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2013).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-2\NDE201.txt

272

unknown

Seq: 20

13-JUL-17

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

11:15

[Vol. 31

mention free exercise, profession of faith, and worship, without a concomitant reference to conscience.139
However, the absence of a specific reference may not be determinative of whether conscience-based viewpoints may be granted
equivalent status to religious beliefs. Such an outcome is uncertain in
Alabama due to the absence of relevant judicial interpretation of the
religion clause in the state constitution and accompanying RFRA. The
equivalency of conscience and religion-based viewpoints in Connecticut
is also uncertain due to the reliance of Connecticut state courts upon
federal free exercise precedent in interpreting the religion clause in
the state constitution.140 This reliance creates the possibility that a
Connecticut state court may incorporate conscience-based jurisprudence into its reasoning in a future case. A similar possibility exists in
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Carolina, as their RFRAs specifically
reference the U.S. Constitution as a primary source for interpretation
of state law,141 and their state courts have relied upon federal precedent in construing the religion clauses in their state constitutions.142
Such an outcome is unlikely in Florida where state courts have cited
federal free exercise precedent with approval,143 but whose state RFRA
139. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing that “the civil rights, privileges, and
capacities of any citizen shall not be in any manner affected by his religious principles”);
ARIZ. CONST. art. XX, para. 1 (stating that “[p]erfect toleration of religious sentiment
shall be secured to every inhabitant of this state, and no inhabitant of this state shall ever
be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship, or
lack of the same”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 3 (protecting “[t]he exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (declaring unconstitutional any law “prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise [of religion]”);
LA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (declaring unconstitutional any law “prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]”); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 18 (providing that “the free enjoyment of all religious sentiments and the different modes of worship shall be held sacred”); OKLA. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (stating that “[p]erfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and
no inhabitant of the State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his
or her mode of religious worship”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2 (declaring unconstitutional any
law “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]”).
140. See, e.g., Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of Conn. v. Plan. & Zoning Comm’n, 941
A.2d 868, 881–82 (Conn. 2008) (deeming federal free exercise precedent to be “persuasive” in interpreting the state constitutional religion clause); see also WESLEY W. HORTON,
THE CONNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 44 (1993) (concluding that
the Connecticut courts have failed to give the state constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion a “significant independent meaning”).
141. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 884 So.2d 747, 754 (Miss. 2004)
(describing the religion clause in the Mississippi Constitution as “a counterpart to the
First Amendment”); Wahid v. State, 716 P.2d 678, 680 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (distribution of controlled substances does not constitute the free exercise of religion); Lewellyn v.
State, 592 P.2d 538, 539–40 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (distribution of controlled substances does not constitute the free exercise of religion); State ex rel. Roberts v. McDonald, 787 P.2d 466, 468–69 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989) (operation of a licensing statute with
respect to a faith-based child care facility does not constitute interference with the free
exercise of religion); Hunt v. McNair, 187 S.E.2d 645, 648 (S.C. 1972) (holding that the
free exercise language within the U.S. Constitution and state constitution are “for all
intents and purposes, the same”).
143. See, e.g., Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So.2d 1023, 1030 (Fla. 2004) (challenging an ordinance prohibiting vertical grave decorations in local cemeteries and con-
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only protects acts and refusals to act substantially motivated by religious
belief.144 A similar outcome is likely in Arizona and Louisiana for the
same reason.145
The remaining thirteen states protect conscience by constitutional
provision, but protection is linked to religion.146 However, such
linkage may not be determinative of whether conscience may be
granted equivalent status to religion. Such an outcome is uncertain in
Kentucky and Rhode Island, as neither explicitly defines religion or
conscience, but does rely upon federal free exercise precedent in interpreting the religion clauses in their state constitutions.147 It is possible
cluding that the federal and state constitutional protections of free exercise are
“coequal”).
144. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. See also State v. Hardesty, 214
P.3d 1004, 1007 (Ariz. 2009) (interpreting Arizona’s RFRA to require that the action or
refusal to act be motivated by a religious belief in the context of marijuana use); but see
Seegers v. Parker, 241 So.2d 213, 216 (La. 1970) (stating that the free exercise provision
of the Louisiana Constitution “embodies . . . in full” that contained in the U.S.
Constitution).
146. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 24 (providing that “[a]ll men have a natural and
indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4 (referring to the “exercise and enjoyment of religious
faith and worship” as “the liberty of conscience”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3 (referring to the
“free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship” as “the liberty of conscience”); IND. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3 (securing for all people the “natural right to worship
ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the dictates of their own consciences” and prohibiting
laws which seek to “control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or
interfere with the rights of conscience”); KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 7 (securing for all
people the “right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience” and prohibiting any control of or interference with such dictates); KY. CONST. §§ 1, 5 (securing the
“right of worshipping Almighty God according to the dictates of . . . consciences” and
prohibiting laws which seek to “control or interfere with the rights of conscience”); MO.
CONST. art. I, § 5 (stating that “all men and women have a natural and indefeasible right
to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences [and] that no
human authority can control or interfere with the rights of conscience”); N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 11 (providing that “[e]very man shall be free to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience”); PA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (stating that “[a]ll men have a
natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own consciences . . . [and] no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or
interfere with the rights of conscience”); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing that “every
person shall be free to worship God according to the dictates of such person’s conscience”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3 (stating that “all men have a natural and indefeasible
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences . . .
[and] no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights
of conscience”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6 (stating that “[a]ll men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences
. . . [and] no human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with
the rights of conscience in matters of religion”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (protecting the
free exercise of religion “according to the dictates of conscience”).
147. See, e.g., Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 529 (W.D. Ky. 2001)
(finding that Kentucky state courts have utilized U.S. Supreme Court precedent to interpret the religion clause within the state constitution); Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 382
S.W.3d 835, 840 (Ky. 2012) (concluding that it was “linguistically impossible” to separate
the free exercise of religion protections set forth in the U.S. and Kentucky Constitutions);
Triplett v. Livingston County Bd. of Educ., 967 S.W.2d 25, 31–33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997)
(relying upon U.S. Supreme Court precedent in the interpretation of the religion clause
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that federal precedent could serve as a means of granting equal protection to conscience-based beliefs under these state constitutions. A similar possibility exists in Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia, as these
states define religion in their RFRAs by reference to their respective
constitutions which, in turn, have been interpreted utilizing federal
precedent.148 Such a result may be less likely in Arkansas, Illinois, and
Missouri, which have utilized federal precedent to interpret the religion
clauses in their respective constitutions, but whose RFRAs are specifically tied to religious beliefs.149 The law in Texas is similarly situated.150 However, while adhering to federal precedent, Texas state
courts have dispensed with belief in a supreme being as a requirement
for the existence of a religion at least in the context of determining taxexempt status.151
The outcome of potential cases in Idaho and New Mexico are
more difficult to discern. Case law interpreting the religion clause in
the Idaho Constitution has noted that the clause “bear[s] no resemblance to those found in the First Amendment [but rather] appear[s]
to be the product of Idaho’s unique religious history.”152 There is also
the suggestion in at least one opinion that the state religion clause may
be “an even greater guardian of religious liberty” than the U.S. Constiwithin the state constitution); In re Philip S., 881 A.2d 931, 935 n.9 (R.I. 2005) (stating
that the U.S. and Rhode Island Constitutions provide “similar protection” of religious
freedom); Church of Pan, Inc. v. Norberg, 507 A.2d 1359, 1363 (R.I. 1986) (concluding
that the claimant lacked sufficient accoutrements of religion in order to be entitled to
tax-exempt status and was primarily secular in nature).
148. See, e.g., Wiest v. Mt. Leb. School Dist., 320 A.2d 362, 366–67 (Pa. 1974) (holding that the rights and freedoms secured by the religion clause in the Pennsylvania Constitution do not “transcend” similar protections contained within the U.S. Constitution);
State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Med. Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734, 761
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that the religion clauses in the Tennessee Constitution are subject to interpretation utilizing the “same principles” as those employed to
interpret similar clauses within the U.S. Constitution); State v. Loudon, 857 S.W.2d 878,
883 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (concluding that the free exercise clauses contained within
the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions were “practically synonymous”); Cha v. Korean
Presbyterian Church of Washington, 553 S.E.2d 511, 515 (Va. 2001) (reaching an identical conclusion regarding the application of the free exercise provisions of the Virginia
and U.S. Constitutions). See also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Viravonga v. Samakitham, 279 S.W.3d 44, 48–49 (Ark. 2008) (construing the free exercise provisions of the Arkansas and U.S. Constitutions uniformly); Mefford v. White, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (construing the free exercise
provisions of the Illinois and U.S. Constitutions uniformly); Oliver v. State Tax Comm’n,
37 S.W.3d 243, 247–52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (construing the religion provisions of the
Missouri and U.S. Constitutions uniformly).
150. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 80 S.W.3d 184, 191 (Tex. App. 2002) (concluding that
the free exercise clauses contained in the U.S. and Texas Constitutions are
“comparable”).
151. See, e.g., Strayhorn v. Ethical Soc’y of Austin, 110 S.W.3d 458, 468–72 (Tex.
App. 2003) (concluding that the requirement of a belief in a supreme being was underinclusive and that the Ethical Society of Austin otherwise met the requirements of a religion
entitled to tax-exempt status) (citing Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir.
1981) and Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207–10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring)).
152. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 450 (9th Cir. 1994).
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tution.153 However, there is also precedent for the conclusion that
interpretation of the state religion clause will hew closely to that utilized
by the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to the First Amendment.154
What is clear is that equation of religious and conscience-based beliefs
will not be based upon Idaho’s RFRA which has been judicially limited
to bona fide religions to the exclusion of purely secular philosophical
concerns.155 A similar conclusion may be drawn with respect to New
Mexico as interpretation of the state constitution’s religion clause follows U.S. Supreme Court precedent, but its RFRA is limited to acts or
refusals to act substantially motivated by religious belief without the
benefit of federal precedent.156
It is unlikely that any attempt to protect conscience based upon the
state constitution or RFRA will succeed in Indiana or Kansas. Both
states have rejected use of federal precedent in the interpretation of
their constitutions’ religion clauses.157 The Indiana Court of Appeals
has restricted conscience-based rights to the right to hold beliefs but
not to exercise such beliefs in disregard of the law.158 Additionally,
both states’ RFRAs focus upon acts and refusals to act motivated by
religious belief.159 A final barrier to the recognition of the right to
conscience in Kansas may be found in a 2012 opinion of the state’s
attorney general interpreting the reference to conscience in the state
constitution as limited to “religious conscience” and excluding beliefs
that are secular in nature.160
If a right to conscience exists and is protected in those states with
RFRAs, the definition of conscience then becomes important. Workable definitions may be derived from state statutes providing for conscience-based protections for individuals and entities in the healthcare
profession. Five states expressly define conscience in their statutes
granting protections in this context. These definitions are remarkably
uniform and broad in their reach. Three states define conscience to
mean religious, moral, or ethical principles sincerely held by any per153. Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 953 (Idaho 1993) (holding that barriers to
the free exercise of religion may violate the religion clause within the Idaho Constitution
even if such barriers do not violate the U.S. Constitution).
154. See State v. Fluewelling, 249 P.3d 375, 377–78 (Idaho 2011).
155. See supra notes 71, 78–86 and accompanying text.
156. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58–67 (N.M. 2013). See
also supra notes 77, 88, and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d
443, 450–51 (Ind. 2001) (declining to apply federal free exercise jurisprudence to an
eminent domain proceeding concerning property utilized by a ministry for religious purposes); Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Pol’y Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 156–57 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011)
(citing with approval earlier Kansas appellate decisions declining to utilize federal free
exercise precedent in interpreting the state constitution).
158. See Gul v. City of Bloomington, 22 N.E.3d 853, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that a contrary holding would be “tantamount to declaring nearly every statute and
ordinance on the books in Indiana unconstitutional, as it is possible to find someone,
somewhere, with a sincere belief that contravenes every law”).
159. See supra notes 71, 74 and accompanying text.
160. See Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2012-19, 2012 WL 3782384, at 2 (Aug. 28, 2012).
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son.161 Two states include religious beliefs and non-religious beliefs in
their definition of conscience as long as secular beliefs occupy a place
in the life of the possessor equivalent to that filled by a deity among
adherents to religious faiths.162
An additional eleven states protect conscience in the context of
healthcare services but do not expressly define the term.163 However,
the definition may be determined utilizing the common and accepted
meaning of the word as all but three of these states require such usage
with respect to undefined statutory terms.164 Thus, conscience may be
defined as “a knowledge or sense of right and wrong, with an urge to do
161. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-611(b), 613 (2016) (defining conscience as
“the religious, moral or ethical principles sincerely held by any person” in the context of
refusals to perform, assist, or participate in an abortion); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1061.20(A)(1), (B)(1) (2016) (defining conscience as a “sincerely held religious
belief or moral conviction” in the context of refusals to participate in the provision of any
health care service); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-3(h), 107-5(1-3), 107-7(1-3), 109-7(1-3)
(2016) (defining conscience as “religious, moral or ethical principles” in the context of
refusals to participate in the provision of any health care service). But see IDAHO ADMIN.
CODE r. 16.03.09.235 (2016) (creating a conscience-based exemption from compliance
with living wills and durable powers of attorney for health care without defining conscience); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:764(A)(2)(h) (2016) (permitting persons to refuse
medical examination, testing, vaccination, or treatment for religious or conscience-based
reasons without defining conscience).
162. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3(e) (2016) (defining conscience as “a sincerely held set of moral convictions arising from belief in and relation to God, or which,
though not so derived, arises from a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled
by God among adherents to religious faiths” in the context of refusals to perform, assist,
counsel, suggest, recommend, refer, or participate in the provision of any health care
service); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3202(d), 3203, 3213(d) (2016) (defining conscience as
“[a] sincerely held set of moral convictions arising from belief in and relation to a deity or
which, though not so derived, obtains from a place in the life of its possessor parallel to
that filled by a deity among adherents to religious faiths” in the context of refusals to
perform, provide, aid, abet, or facilitate an abortion).
163. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(C)(1) (2016) (living wills and health care
directives); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-6-109(b)(1) (2016) (individual instructions and healthcare decisions); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-131e(b) (2016) (vaccinations); FLA. STAT.
§ 381.00315(1)(c)(4) (2016) (vaccinations); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-10A-13(D)(3), 24-7A7(E) (2016) (vaccinations, individual instructions and health care decisions); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 43, § 7.1(A) (2016) (solemnization and recognition of marriage by religious officials
and organizations); 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-8-4 (2016) (vaccinations); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-4-520(A)(3) (2016) (vaccinations); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-108(a), 68-111808(d)(1) (2016) (living wills, individual instructions and advance directives for health
care); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 38.001(c)(1)(B), 51.933(d)(1)(B) (2016) (immunizations); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 97.62 (2016) (immunizations); 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 30-20-240(5) (2016) (advance directives for health care).
164. For those states that require utilization of the common and accepted meaning
of words by statute, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-213 (2016) (“common and approved
use of the language”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2016) (“plain and unambiguous” meaning); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-2 (2016) (“common usage”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1 (2016)
(“ordinary sense”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (2016) (“common usage”). For
those states that require utilization of the common and accepted meaning of words by
case law, see State v. V.H., 429 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Ark. 2013) (“ordinary and usually
accepted meaning”); Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 484 (R.I. 2002) (“plain, ordinary
meaning”); Alger v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 563, 565 (Va. 2004) (“plain meaning”).
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right . . . [and] feelings of guilt if one violates [an ethical] principle.”165
One additional state, specifically Alabama, has adopted the common
and accepted meaning of conscience through case law.166 However,
this approach is inapplicable to those statutes which purportedly protect conscience rights but do not expressly utilize the term in their
body.167
IV. THE EQUIVALENCY

OF

RELIGION

AND

CONSCIENCE

A. Conscience as the Moral Equivalent of Religion
The interrelationship of religion and conscience raises the issue of
their equivalency. On one side of the equation are commentators who
differentiate between religion and conscience, with the latter receiving
less protection.168 Other scholars equate conscience and religion but
have offered differing rationales for their conclusions.169 How should
165. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 296 (1988). See also Conscience, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) (defining conscience as “[t]he moral sense; the faculty of judging the moral qualities of actions, or of discriminating between right and wrong; particularly applied to one’s . . . own conduct [and] in a wider sense, denoting a similar
application of the standards of morality to the acts of others”).
166. See Ridgeview Health Care Ctr. v. Meadows, 590 So.2d 243, 245 (Ala. 1991)
(adopting the definition of conscience from the American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language, specifically, “[t]he faculty of recognizing the distinction between right and
wrong in regard to one’s own conduct”).
167. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154(A-B) (2016) (objection to abortion on
“moral or religious grounds”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-601(a) (2016) (objection to termination of pregnancy for any reason); FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(8) (2016) (objection to termination of pregnancy for any reason); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2016) (objection to
termination of pregnancy for any reason); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(4) (2016)
(objection to abortion on “moral, religious or professional grounds”); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 197.032(1) (2016) (objection to abortion on “moral, ethical or religious beliefs”); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (2016) (termination of pregnancy on “moral or religious grounds”);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741(A) (2016) (objection to abortion for any reason); 23 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-17-11 (2016) (objection to abortion or sterilization on “moral or religious
grounds”); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-40–44-41-50 (2016) (objection to abortion without
the necessity of specifying the reason); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-204 (2016) (objection to
abortion for any reason); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.001 (objection to abortion for any
reason); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-75, 63.2-1709.3 (2016) (objection to abortion for “personal, ethical, moral or religious grounds” and objection to placement of children in
foster care or for adoption on “religious or moral convictions”).
168. See, e.g., JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 54–55 (1996) (supporting
exemptions from civil obligations solely for religious beliefs and practices); Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215,
234–36 (2009) (supporting a broad definition of religion and accompanying protection
with weaker protections for claims of conscience); McConnell, supra note 51, at
1499–1500 (1990) (supporting exemptions from civil obligations solely for religious
beliefs and practices); Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 325, 357 (2005) (supporting a broad definition of religion and accompanying protection with weaker protections for claims of conscience).
169. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 99, at 208–09 (equating religious freedom and
liberty of conscience and contending that fairness requires equal accommodation of
both); SANDEL, supra note 112, at 65–71 (advocating conscience-based exemptions in a
manner similar to those available to religious beliefs); Rodney K. Smith, Converting the
Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute with a Little “Conscience,” 1996 BYU L. REV. 645,
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these differing points of view be reconciled in a rapidly changing and
secularizing nation with increasingly diverse belief systems?
Conscience does not appear in the text of the U.S. Constitution.170
This is not due to lack of effort as drafts of what would ultimately
become the Free Exercise Clause included protections for the full and
free exercise of both religion and conscience.171 Determining the reason for the ultimate exclusion of conscience—be it accidental or intentional—remains a topic of speculation.172
However, “religion” and “conscience” were interchangeable in
times past.173 This interchangeability renders the exclusion of conscience from the Free Exercise Clause and the reasons, therefore, of
lesser importance as the terms were synonymous. Calls for freedom of
religion were understood to be based upon freedom of conscience,
which had a decidedly religious connotation.174 The primary argument
for religious freedom, whether at the federal or state levels, was the
inviolability of conscience.175 This argument was not shared by all
members of society.176 Nevertheless, this interchangeability has continued into the present time, the end result of which is the current “conceptual muddle.”177
The continued interchangeability of these terms in modern times
is suspect. Conscience has become secularized far beyond eighteenthcentury understandings. Liberty of conscience is no longer exclusively
bound to freedom to subscribe to particular religious beliefs or engage
in religious actions consistent with faith-based views regarding salva662–74 (1996) (advocating conscience-based exemptions in a manner similar to those
available to religious beliefs).
170. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 90, at 911.
171. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 27, at 66 (discussing the initial approval of language
prohibiting the U.S. Congress from infringing on the right of conscience); Beschle, supra
note 11, at 381 (discussing earlier drafts of the First Amendment referring to “ ‘the full
and equal rights of conscience,’ rather than the ‘free exercise’ of religion” and the ultimate exclusion of conscience from the final document); Chapman, supra note 25, at 1468
(discussing drafts of the Free Exercise Clause that included the free exercise of religion
and the rights of conscience).
172. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 90, at 911 (contending that the absence of conscience from the U.S. Constitution is “probably a historical accident”). But see McConnell,
supra note 51, at 1495 (concluding that the exclusion of conscience was deliberate and
designed to protect religion as a subset of conscience).
173. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 90, at 912 (contending that the framers of the U.S.
Constitution viewed religion and conscience as “virtually interchangeable concepts”). See
also Chapman, supra note 25, at 1460 (contending that “[t]he drafters and ratifiers of the
First Amendment . . . used religious freedom and liberty of conscience interchangeably”).
174. See Smith, supra note 90, at 912.
175. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 1466 (discussing the primacy of this argument
during debates regarding the U.S. Constitution and colonial and state constitutions and
bills of rights).
176. Id. at 1464–66, 1481–84 (comparing the religious nature of conscience in the
teachings of the Apostle Paul and the Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church with the
separation of the concepts in the Scottish Common Sense Movement and the sermons of
Simeon Howard).
177. Id. at 1461.
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tion.178 Instead, conscience grants freedom from coercion regarding
beliefs and actions that violate an individual’s principles.179 The result
is that protection of religious liberty is only partially protective of conscience. Secular conscience, standing outside the shield afforded to
religion, is, without more, unprotected.
This discussion is to make but one simple point—that while there
is overlap between religion and conscience, they are not entirely the
same. A moral judgment is all that is required to deem a belief or
response conscience-based.180 Of course, beliefs and responses may
have strong religious components, but such are not required.181 Conversely, religious beliefs and actions require no moral judgment and
may, in fact, run counter to such judgments, that is to say, conscience.182 For example, a religious person may encounter circumstances pitting their religious convictions against their conscience.183
In such circumstances, a religious person may feel compelled to engage
in a course of action outside of his or her faith-based convictions.184
These examples demonstrate that religion and conscience overlap but
do not overlay one another.185 To conclude otherwise leaves religion
with very little independent meaning.186
Interchangeability also fails to recognize that religious beliefs may
merit greater status than moral beliefs. Religion, in the words of one
commentator, is “a cluster of ideas meant to encompass the variety of
beliefs and actions, personal and social, [which] respond to the experiences of birth, learning, failure, love, death, and the awe of being small
in a grand universe.”187 These ideas emanate from a higher power, are
part of a belief system shared with others, and impose categorical
demands upon adherents without regard to personal consequences.188
These elements may be absent from responses based upon conscience,
which may concern lesser issues rather than grand questions of ultimate
meaning and whose accompanying duties more often reflect individual
178. See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 346, 424–25 (2002).
179. See supra notes 89–119 and accompanying text. See also Feldman, supra note
178, at 424–25.
180. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 1491.
181. Id. at 1461.
182. See 6 DIETRICH BONHOEFFER WORKS: ETHICS 278, 283 (Ilse Tödt et al. trans,
Clifford J. Green ed., 2005). See also Chapman, supra note 25, at 1491.
183. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 1484 (discussing such moral dilemmas in the
context of the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church).
184. See Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 911 (noting that “many sincerely religious
people experience strong obligations that they do not perceive as flowing from their religious convictions and practice”).
185. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 1491.
186. Id. at 1471–72 (criticizing Rawls’ failure to distinguish between religion and
morality, the net result of which was to render “conscience so vague that it could encompass virtually any strongly held belief about anything, leaving religion with little independent meaning”).
187. Id. at 1461. See also supra notes 12–24 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
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autonomy rather than obedience to a higher power.189 These differences may justify greater respect for and deference to religious
belief.190
But must conscience address grand questions of ultimate meaning
in order to merit protection? Such requirement is to return to the
eighteenth-century concept of interchangeability, thereby failing to
extend protection to conscience independent of its similarity to religion. Conscience and responses based thereupon deserve better.
Conscience may address the same issues as religion. The exercise
of conscience is simply different from the exercise of religion. Religious belief and actions are individual and group experiences.191 These
beliefs and actions involve some degree of surrender of individual
autonomy based upon their shared nature.192 Conscience-based beliefs
and responses are expressions of autonomy exercising a universal
faculty possessed by all and drawing upon each individual’s pool of
moral knowledge.193 Conscience applies individual moral knowledge
to specific situations whereas religion is a source of universal moral
law.194 Is religion so much more deserving as to merit more protection
than conscience?
Protection of communal religious beliefs and acts without protection of their individualized and nonreligious equivalents is unfair.195
Conscience becomes a second-class right if the primary foci are content
and the manner in which the belief is exercised rather than the integrity of the individual.196 This demotion results in the government singling out particular moral perspectives for protection based exclusively
upon their religiosity.197 Such disparate treatment and resulting favor189. See Smith, supra note 90, at 922–26 (citing “higher duty” as a rationale for
affording greater protection to religious belief in comparison to secular conscience).
Greenawalt adds the element of sincerity to this distinction as it is easier to determine the
sincerity of religious beliefs due to their attachment to like-minded organizations. Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 915. While this may be true with respect to “mainstream religions,” it is questionable with respect to unfamiliar or unconventional faiths. See supra
notes 26–28 and accompanying text. Furthermore, as Greenawalt concedes, there are
circumstances when a claim of conscience is unlikely to be insincere due to the potential
harm that may be suffered by the claimant or the absence of an advantage to be gained by
asserting the claim. See Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 915 (citing conscience claims in the
health care industry). See also supra notes 120–22, 167–73 and accompanying text.
190. See Smith, supra note 90, at 936.
191. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
193. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 1490. See also Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 915
(noting that “nonreligious claims of conscience” more likely reflect individualized
reactions).
194. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 1490 n.223 (citing John Locke for the proposition that while conscience serves as “a witness to a ‘universal moral law’ or ‘rule of right,’ ”
it does not serve as a witness to the “law [as] delivered by Moses”).
195. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
196. See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Hollow Promise of Freedom of Conscience, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1389, 1448 (2012).
197. See Sepper, supra note 91, at 1531 (contending that “[f]ocusing on the content
of a conviction rather than the integrity of the individual simply amounts to legislating a
particular moral perspective, rather than dedication to freedom of conscience”).
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itism lack adequate justification assuming secular conscience is worthy
of protection.198 Recognizing and remedying this disparity was the
basis for recent judicial opinions extending equal protection to conscience-based beliefs and responses.199
This disparity also fails to recognize that protection of religion and
conscience constitutes respect for personhood owed to individuals by
their governments.200 If religion and conscience are central to individual identity, it follows that governmentally-compelled violations infringe
upon personhood.201 Infringements detract from personhood by
inflicting upon affected individuals the distressing choice between
adhering to one’s beliefs and suffering possible legal repercussions, and
deviating from beliefs with accompanying loss of identity.202 Such deference is not absolute lest government become a hostage to individual
prerogatives and cease functioning for the greater good.203 The government also retains the power to cajole, influence, and persuade.204
But absent these circumstances, governments must respect individual
personhood which includes beliefs, actions, and responses based upon
religion and conscience.205
There remain practical problems associated with recognition of
freedom of conscience. Free belief and exercise of religion are well
protected in the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and case law. The
same is true at the state level. Similarly, no one could seriously argue
for lesser protection for one’s inner beliefs based upon the pool of
one’s moral knowledge, i.e. conscience. But the question remains
whether there should be a right to free exercise of conscience complementary to the free exercise of religion. Are we willing to live with the
consequences if such a right is recognized and broadly exercised? It is
thus necessary to further explore the legal implications of equating conscience and religion in action.
B. Conscience as the Legal Equivalent of Religion
The law does not require absolute precision in order to create and
enforce legal rights. Courts have found conscience clear enough to
support a legal right despite the absence of a universally agreed-upon
definition.206 The lack of cases with respect to this right as compared
to religion reflects nothing more than the increased frequency in which
religion has been litigated. This difference may also be due to the sub198. See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 104, at 1355.
199. See supra notes 121–37 and accompanying text.
200. See Smith, supra note 90, at 935–36.
201. Id. at 935.
202. Id.
203. Id. (contending that conscience is not “some sort of absolute value that government must never contravene . . . . [as] sacrificing one individual’s personhood may
serve to promote other peoples’ interests: these are tradeoffs that we sometimes knowingly make”).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 936–37 (contending that the government should avoid “undermining
personhood by injuring the belief-action integration that helps to constitute the person”).
206. See supra notes 41–50, 121–37 and accompanying text.
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suming of claims of conscience within religious freedom claims.
Regardless, claims of freedom of conscience and religious liberty share
sufficient characteristics to warrant comparable treatment and
protection.207
Comparable treatment has the beneficial effect of removing advantages for religious objectors who could then “escape burdens or receive
benefits that have significant secular value” otherwise unavailable to
non-religious persons who have similar beliefs but which lack attribution to a divine source.208 A lack of comparable treatment may provide
an unfair advantage to religious persons over nonreligious persons
operating without the benefit of an accompanying exemption.209 The
result may be a distortion of the marketplace of ideas in favor of religious messages.210 Fairness and the possibility of distortion were clearly
considerations motivating recent judicial decisions equating religious
and secular beliefs.211
Comparable treatment also relieves courts of a potentially difficult
evidentiary burden. Free exercise claims obviously have a foundation in
and connection to religious belief. The same may be true for an
unknown number of conscience-based claims. However, if such claims
are not afforded equal treatment to those based upon religion, courts
will be required to sift through the motivations of the claimant and the
religious versus secular nature of the underlying beliefs. Beliefs and
accompanying actions may be protected if the court deems them to be
religiously motivated. By contrast, purely secular beliefs and responses,
207. See Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 916 (contending that religious and conscience-based claims are “similar enough to warrant comparable treatment . . . even when
they are demonstrably mistaken”). See also supra note 129 and accompanying text.
208. Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 55,
71 (2006). “Secular value” refers to any cost savings associated with an objection and
consequent exemption from legal obligations including facilitation of communication
and reduction of operational costs. Id. at 64, 71. See also Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1994); Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and
Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 123 (2006) (contending that “it is
essential that we not privilege moral beliefs that are religiously based over other sincerely
held core, moral beliefs”); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591, 613–23 (1990) (contending that religious
exemptions lack legal justification as there is nothing distinctive about religion that justifies granting its privileged status over other rights).
209. Brownstein, supra note 208, at 71. See also West, supra note 208, at 601 (stating
that “exemptions to certain persons because of their religion . . . may give those religions
. . . an unfair advantage over other religions, secular ideologies, churches, nonprofit organizations, or businesses with which they compete for members and money”). Alvin Lin,
Note, Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Laws and the Religious Liberty Protection Act: The
Pitfalls of the Compelling State Interest Inquiry, 89 GEO. L.J. 719, 750 (2001) (contending that
religious objectors possess “a tool to bypass the effects of neutral, generally applicable
laws on the basis of religious reasons that are unavailable to objectors with nonreligious
reasons”).
210. Brownstein, supra note 208, at 64–65. See also Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Why RFRAs Don’t Work, 31
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 153, 196 (2000) (contending that religious objectors occupy a privileged
position with respect to every state and local law or policy).
211. See supra notes 122–25, 133–37 and accompanying text.
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and those lacking a sufficient connection to religious motivation would
be unprotected.
The determination of underlying motivations is essential in the
absence of equivalence as every claim of protected activity turns upon
its resolution. Courts must make this determination despite difficulties
associated with judging the magnitude of convictions.212 This prospect
is all the more difficult if the claimant is unable to completely describe
his or her convictions, articulate their depths, and explain their centrality to his or her life.213 Even an intensive examination of the claimant,
his or her beliefs, and the relationship of those beliefs to the response
at issue cannot guarantee a clear determination with respect to personal motivations and sincerity.214
Equivalent treatment for religion and conscience eliminates these
burdens as courts would no longer need to differentiate between religious and secular motivations. All such beliefs, whether religious or secular, would be protected as long as they are sincerely held.215
Government restriction of conscience-based responses would be subject
to the same limitations as those imposed upon the free exercise of religion. This would include application of the substantial burden, compelling governmental interest, and least restrictive means tests.216
Equivalency would relieve courts of the obligation to engage in
“armchair social theory” in order to determine whether a claim of conscience had an adequate religious foundation to merit protection.217
That said, equivalency raises a different set of evidentiary issues. For
example, secular conscience claims generally cannot cite to supporting
“texts, doctrines, and commands, either written or passed down orally
among many adherents.”218 Courts confronted with such claims would
212. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. See also Greenawalt, supra note 44,
at 912 (noting “how hard it may be to draw a line between nonreligious and religious
claims when people are somewhat religions [sic] and the connection of conscience to
religious convictions is weak or remote”).
213. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (in which the Court
affirmed its previous determination that “[t]he door of the Free Exercise Clause stands
tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs” and that the government “may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief . . . nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious beliefs abhorrent to the
authorities”) (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953); and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
216. Id. at 403–07 (holding that religiously-motivated acts, as contrasted with
beliefs, were “not totally free from legislative restrictions” but striking down substantial
burdens upon free exercise unless the government could demonstrate the presence of a
compelling interest accomplished through utilization of the least restrictive means). See
also supra note 52 and accompanying text. The standards may be different in those states
without a RFRA or case law extending enhanced protection to free exercise. See supra
note 51 and accompanying text.
217. Chapman, supra note 25, at 1493. See also Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 912
(contending that “[t]he occasional difficulty of drawing the distinction in practice
[between nonreligious and religious claims] is one reason to treat religious and nonreligious claims equally”).
218. LEITER, supra note 13, at 95.
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be required to “peer into the depths of a man’s soul.”219 But courts are
called upon to peer into these depths on a routine basis in any case in
which subjective intent is at issue.220 The determination of the presence of scienter in fraud, mens rea in a criminal prosecution, corrupt
intent in a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act case, or impermissible discriminatory animus in wrongful discharge litigation are but some examples. Furthermore, as previously noted, these determinations are easier
when an individual has suffered some negative consequence as a result
of his or her response.221
Similarities, fairness and evidentiary issues aside, future efforts
equating conscience and religion, judicial, statutory or otherwise,
should proceed with considerable caution. The introduction of a
broad-based conscience right and accompanying exemptions may be
thought of as across-the-board simultaneous amendments of every federal and state statute that imposes some obligation to which a person
may have an objection.222 There is a further risk that equivalence and
accompanying accommodations and exemptions will become permanent. Courts are unlikely to invalidate a legislatively-recognized right to
conscience and accompanying privileges. Legislatures are also unlikely
to repeal such enabling legislation or overturn a judicial opinion recognizing a constitutional basis for such a right. In a manner similar to the
free exercise of religion and accompanying accommodations and
exemptions, any such effort would not be neutral as it would target persons who conscience rights were previously recognized.223
As a result, it is probable that the government would never eliminate or narrow a previously-recognized right to conscience even in
response to changes in public opinion. After all, if the free exercise of
religion is not subject to restraint based upon public opinion or the
acceptability of the beliefs and practices associated therewith, then the
same must hold true for its doctrinal counterpart. Any recognized right
to conscience may become a permanent part of constitutional jurisprudence. This possibility would include the recognition of conscience
rights with unknown and unknowable consequences. The boundaries
of such rights would be tested, interpreted, and expanded perhaps
beyond those circumstances serving as their original justification.
These possibilities merit a cautious approach by courts and legislatures
in addressing conscience-based issues.
One possible unforeseen consequence of equivalence is the identity of persons able to assert conscience rights. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court recognized free exercise rights for
219. Id.
220. See Mark L. Rienzi, The Case for Religious Exemptions—Whether Religion is Special or
Not, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1414 (2014) (reviewing BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013)).
221. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
222. See Lund, supra note 51, at 493 (describing such amendments in the context of
state RFRAs).
223. Id. at 495.
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close corporations.224 If close corporations possess free exercise rights,
do they not also possess conscience rights? The answer to this question
would appear to be positive given that current statutory and case law
have extended conscience rights to non-natural persons.225 If not, on
what basis might such entities be denied these rights? It is fair to conclude that conscience rights extend to non-natural persons to the same
extent as the right to free exercise of religion. Caution is once again
warranted as the full implications of Hobby Lobby have yet to be
determined.
Furthermore, as noted in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Hobby Lobby,
the logic of the majority opinion extends free exercise rights to “corporations of any size, public or private.”226 Whereas the harm that a conscience-based claim by a truly “small business” may be limited, this harm
would be magnified should such a claim be made by a larger entity. If
conscience rights are limited to “small businesses,” on what legal
ground should such limitation rest? The clear implication from the
majority opinion in Hobby Lobby is that ownership structure rather than
size is an important factor. But “close corporations” can be quite
large.227 The extension of free exercise rights to all businesses regardless of revenues, number of employees, or market impact also undercuts the argument that the relationship between an individual’s
religious and moral principles and the operation of his or her business
becomes attenuated as a result of growth.228 It is naı̈ve to assume that
the bigger the business, the less likely it is to assert religious or conscience rights. Hobby Lobby’s assurance that it is “improbable” that large,
publicly traded companies will avail themselves of such rights remains
to be determined.229
If size is not determinative, should the presence or absence of conscience rights be based upon the nature of the commerce in which the
business is engaged? For example, personal service providers tend to
be “the embodiment[ ] of the owner’s identity.”230 But making a
224. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).
225. See supra notes 121–25, 133–37, 161–62 and accompanying text.
226. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 2797 n.19 (citing Mars, Inc. ($33 billion in revenues and 72,000 employees) and Cargill, Inc. ($136 billion in revenues and 140,000 employees) as two examples
of family-owned or closely held businesses).
228. This argument contends that the larger a business becomes, the less justification exists for personal identification of the owner’s religious beliefs with the business’
operations. See, e.g., Kelly Catherine Chapman, Gay Rights, The Bible, and Public Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO. L.J. 1783,
1810 (2012) (contending that “[o]nce an entity reaches a critical mass, the justification
for an owner’s feeling that his or her religious freedoms have been infringed upon
through a personal identification with his or her business . . . becomes less credible”);
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 199 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that “[l]arge businesses take
up more market share, and an owner’s claim of personal responsibility for everything that
happens in his business grows more attenuated as the business expands.”).
229. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
230. Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Claims Have in
Common, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 227 (2010).
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broad-based right such as conscience contingent upon the type of commerce at issue appears arbitrary and lacking in clear guidance from legislatures and courts. Such attempts have also been rejected in the
context of free exercise as it relates to public accommodation statutes.231 These failed efforts to carve out a religious exemption in the
context of personal services establish a strong precedent weighing
against conscience-based attempts.
Considerable care is also necessary in order to blunt criticism that
recognition of conscience rights is “tantamount to constitutionalizing a
right to civil disobedience”232 or creating “an individual right of nullification.”233 Regardless of how it is characterized, the concern is that
recognition without clear limitations would be equivalent to the “legalization of anarchy.”234 Such circumstances, should they come to pass,
cast significant doubt upon the ability of government to perform its
basic functions lest it encroach upon one or more citizens’ sincerelyheld, but non-religious, beliefs.235
Recognition may also impose burdens on others. Individuals may
be burdened to the extent that they are required to bear the costs associated with an exercise of conscience rights, be it through a denial of
access to desired goods and services, increased financial and time costs,
or other potential injuries and inconveniences.236 These costs may be
shared with others as recognition potentially interferes with government’s obligation to determine, secure, and promote general welfare
and the common good.237 Collective obedience to generally applicable
laws are necessary to achieve these outcomes.238 The recognition of
conscience rights is an “objectionable injury to the general welfare” if it
results in selective exemptions from such laws.239 The recognition of a
231. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
232. LEITER, supra note 13, at 94.
233. Beschle, supra note 11, at 382.
234. LEITER, supra note 13, at 94.
235. See Feldman, supra note 178, at 426.
236. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (noting that absent robust legal
protections, discrete groups could be excluded from an “almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society”); See also Brownstein, supra note 208, at 128 (discussing injury to individuals resulting from the
recognition of free exercise rights and specifically noting that religious exemptions are
difficult to justify if they cause “significant harm to specific individuals or the members of
a discrete class” and force such individuals and groups to bear the entire cost of any
exemption while others to whom there is no religious objection enjoy the full benefits
and protections of the law); Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and ThirdParty Harms, 84 MINN. L. REV. 589, 622 (2000) (contending that religious beliefs and
practices are unreasonably privileged when they cause harm to and impose unequal burdens upon individuals and groups and that courts are less deferential to such beliefs and
practices when they “perceive third parties to be at risk of harm”).
237. LEITER, supra note 13, at 118; See also Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309
P.3d 53, 64 (N.M. 2013) (discussing the role of the government to ensure opportunities
for full and equal participation in the market by all persons and protect individuals from
humiliation and dignitary harm).
238. LEITER, supra note 13, at 99.
239. Id. But see Rienzi, supra note 220, at 1415 (contending that the granting of
exemptions based upon free exercise considerations advances the common good and is

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-2\NDE201.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 35

THE EQUIVALENCE OF RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE

13-JUL-17

11:15

287

right to conscience and its equivalency with religion may promote
greater individual freedom to the extent that it restrains government
from forcing individuals and institutions to violate deeply and sincerely
held beliefs.240 The desirability of this outcome in comparison to “a
system in which the coercive power of government can be employed by
the majority to stifle differences and force conformity even without a
particularly strong reason” is unquestioned.241 The issue is rather who
should bear the burdens that accompany this enhanced personal
freedom.
One potential response to these concerns is to deny their legitimacy. The record to date with respect to free exercise rights and
accompanying exemptions is hardly one of anarchy. The federal RFRA
and many of the state RFRAs are now more than twenty years old.242
The enforcement of these statutes has not created anything close to
chaos. In fact, the statutes have been widely criticized as ineffective and
largely irrelevant.243 Conscience exemptions also have been engrained
in the U.S. legal system with respect to a wide variety of circumstances
without accompanying anarchy.244 It is unlikely that the recognition of
additional conscience claims would have a dramatic impact given that
most claims are at least in part religious rather than entirely secular in
nature and thereby already qualify for protection under preexisting
RFRAs or constitutional provisions.245 Limitations upon utilization of
state RFRAs and constitutional provisions to advance purely secular
claims also may limit the impact of equivalency.246 Societal and individual burdens that may result from the recognition of such claims are
likely to be minimal if not non-existent.247
Nevertheless, there remains an issue regarding under what circumstances, if any, should such conscience rights yield to other interests.
For example, should a conscience-based objection give way if its assertion would impose a heavy burden upon an individual perhaps by limiting access to a good or service or substantially increasing its cost? Such
not “necessarily injurious to the general welfare”). According to Rienzi, exemptions
would be legislatively abolished if they were determined to threaten the common good.
However, the likelihood of abolition is perhaps more difficult than anticipated by Rienzi.
See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
240. See Rienzi, supra note 220, at 1410 (stating that “[a]s a general rule, in a free
and pluralistic society, the government should not force people and institutions to violate
their deeply held beliefs unless it has a particularly strong reason to do so”).
241. Id. (further contending that such a system is “incompatible with the nation’s
aspiration to be welcoming, inclusive, and pluralistic”).
242. See supra notes 5, 51, and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 51, at 468, 479–80 (contending that RFRAs “simply
have not translated into a dependable source of protection for religious liberty at the
state level” and that there is “reason to doubt that state RFRAs provide meaningful protection for religious observance” given the almost complete absence of litigated claims).
244. See supra notes 161–67 and accompanying text; see also Mark L. Rienzi, The
Constitutional Right Not to Kill, 62 EMORY L.J. 121, 134–35, 139–41, 145 (2012) (discussing
conscience-based objections to military service, capital punishment and assisted suicide).
245. See Rienzi, supra note 220, at 1412.
246. See supra notes 152–60 and accompanying text.
247. See Rienzi, supra note 220, at 1415.
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an exemption has been proposed for religious objectors to same-sex
marriage.248 Should such an exemption be available for secular-based
objections as well and, if not, why not assuming religion and conscience
merit equal protection?
There are several difficulties with a hardship exemption assuming
that it is available for conscience-based objections. An initial difficulty
is the determination of what constitutes a hardship. One method of
defining hardship in the context of access to goods and services is
whether there are alternate providers.249 However, this method of
determining hardship places burdens upon objectors with respect to
determining the identity of alternate providers and whether goods or
services offered by such providers are adequate substitutes.250 Measurement of hardship is also problematic. Possible measures include cost
increases, the financial ability of the affected party to bear such costs,
and the geographic availability of substitute goods and services.251 A
satisfactory legislative balance readily adaptable to the myriad of circumstances in which it would arise is improbable.252 Reliance upon
courts presents these same problems as well as introducing additional
costs and uncertainty associated with litigation.253 An unfair resolution
would result from either approach given that the valid exercise of conscience rights in either case would turn upon the location of the objector, cost, and other factors apart from what should be the determinative
factors, specifically, the belief in question and the sincerity in which it is
held.254
Another issue is whether providers of “vital goods or services”
should be permitted to deny access to members of the public for conscience-based reasons. Exceptions to the right to exercise conscience
under such circumstances would be controversial and risk either overbreadth or underinclusiveness.255 This assumes that there is an
accepted definition of “vital goods and services,” which is unlikely to
occur given the wide variety of definitions contained within state law.256
248. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 230, at 208; Laycock, supra note 228, at 200.
249. See Kelly Catherine Chapman, Gay Rights, The Bible, and Public Accommodations:
An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1814
(2012).
250. Id. at 1814 (noting that this definition of hardship would require the cataloging of every business in order to keep an accurate account of additions or losses to the
market thereby placing a “great burden on the business to remain cognizant of every new
move, as well as to rely on its own judgment about whether a service or business is substantially similar enough to be considered a substitute”).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1815.
253. Id. at 1814.
254. Id. at 1815.
255. For example, vague platitudes about “preservation of life, health, and public
safety” are meaningless without further specificity which would most likely be acquired
through judicial precedent over an extended period of time. Conversely, a specific “laundry list” of goods and services deemed “vital” could not possibly be all-inclusive and anticipate every future circumstance.
256. For a discussion of the definition of “vital services” in the context of sexual
orientation discrimination, see Dhooge, supra note 31, at 357 n.169.
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These varying definitions have the potential to create differences
between jurisdictions. Such variations create an impression of arbitrariness which may serve as grounds for future judicial challenges.
Enforcement of access rights through the threat of administrative
action or litigation would prove unpopular although perhaps to a lesser
degree than if the enforcement action was directed against persons
asserting free exercise rights.
Another potential difficulty relates to indirect violations of conscience. If direct government restrictions are subject to the same limitations as those imposed upon the free exercise of religion, what
standards should govern potential indirect violations? Should conscientious objectors be able to block governmental actions that facilitate
objectionable behavior?
Same-sex marriage, the impetus underlying many state RFRAs, is
but one such example.257 Conscience-based objections to facilitating
same-sex marriage go well beyond merely providing a venue, invitations, flowers, and a cake. As noted by the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, many other actions could facilitate same-sex marriage.258
Should a conscience-based objection to same-sex marriage permit a
landlord to refuse to rent an apartment to a same-sex couple? Should
such an objection allow an employer to threaten an employee with termination should he or she have a same-sex partner, let alone marry
them? The answer to these questions must be “yes” if such exemptions
are provided to religious objectors. Any action that makes living
arrangements and financial stability easier for same-sex couples potentially facilitates marriage regardless of whether the objection is religious
or secular. But if this proposed exemption is too vague and capable of
abuse in a religious context, then it is most certainly so in the context of
conscience.259
It is unlikely that a conscience-based exemption would be limited
to same-sex marriage. If the basis for the objection is homosexuality
rather than the institution of marriage, then the proponent should be
able to assert an objection to all members of the LGBT community,
married or not.260 If the purpose of equivalency is to recognize and
protect sincere conscience-based beliefs and responses, then why
should any potential exemption from antidiscrimination laws be limited
to homosexuals? If this is the true purpose of equivalency, then any
accompanying exemption should permit different treatment of any
group, individual, or conduct upon which there is a sincerely-held
257. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
258. See THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND STATE
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 2 (Jan. 2009) (listing employment of a person in a same-sex
marriage, the extension of benefits to same-sex spouses, and providing housing to samesex couples as examples).
259. See Michael Kent Curtis, Essay, A Unique Religious Exemption from Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those Who Discriminate Against
Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 194 (2012) (contending
that a religion-based “facilitation” exemption to same-sex marriage is too vague and capable of abuse to serve as a serious basis for legislation).
260. Id. at 183, 194.
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moral viewpoint.261 This may include unmarried heterosexual couples
who cohabitate, members of particular ethnic groups, women, and even
religious believers. Differing treatment may be prohibited by federal
law in some circumstances.262 However, such results are arguably permissible from the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, which only expressly
prohibited race discrimination on religious grounds.263 Presumably
this limitation would be identical for equivalent conscience-based
objections.
There should be no blanket exemptions for conscience-based
responses in the same manner as there are no such exemptions for free
exercise.264 The protections afforded to free exercise by the federal
RFRA would be applicable to claims of conscience at the federal
level.265 Applying this statute, the government would be prohibited
from imposing substantial burdens upon a person’s exercise of conscience even if the burden resulted from a rule of general applicability
unless it was acting in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and utilizing the least restrictive means of furthering such interest.
Similar results may obtain in those states with RFRAs although slight
variations between states may lead to different results across jurisdictions.266 Conscience-based claims may be subject to the limitations
applicable to their religious equivalents through application of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s opinion in Employment Division v. Smith in states without RFRAs or whose RFRAs are restricted to purely religious claims.267
Conscientious objectors would be required to comply with neutral laws
of general applicability without requiring the government demonstrate
261. Id. at 194 (advancing such a contention in the context of religion).
262. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), 2000e-2(a)(1) (2016).
263. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014) (stating
that the Court’s opinion did not provide a “shield” for racial discrimination on the basis
of religion as “[t]he Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial
discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal”).
264. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 676–77 (1999) (stating that, in the context of free exercise, if such
claims “sweep too broadly, it is virtually impossible to avoid situations where most reasonable people would agree that secular concerns trump arguably religious claims” and that
there are “many situations where it is reasonable to expect religious groups to respect and
be willing to accommodate the needs of surrounding society”). Professor Brownstein
summarized the need for acceptance of limitations as follows: “Broadly defined rights
cannot always receive rigorous protection because doing so would unreasonably interfere
with the government’s ability to further the public good. No democratic society will surrender its power to pursue interests that conflict with rights so completely and irrevocably. Insistence on a rigid commitment to rigorous review risks an obvious response: the
scope of the right will be limited to only those situations in which it does not conflict with
any interests the society values or cares about.” Brownstein, supra note 208, at 82.
265. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
266. See Lucien J. Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes, Sexual Orientation and Religious Liberty: Free Access or Free Exercise?, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2016) (discussing
variations among state RFRAs with respect to definitions, the determination of substantial
burdens, and application of the compelling interest and least restrictive means tests). See
also supra notes 68–88 and accompanying text.
267. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). See also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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an underlying compelling interest.268 Significantly fewer consciencebased claims would be successful applying this more exacting standard.269 While imperfect and non-uniform, these three standards have
proven durable, workable, and consistent with settled values.270
The outcome of any given case will vary assuming that the recognition of conscience claims is so limited. Claims will be well-justified in
some circumstances. In other cases, such claims may inject ill-advised
“morality determinations” into decision-making thereby inviting arbitrary, unpredictable, and discriminatory results.271 Regardless of the
type of case, it will be necessary to balance the desirability of protecting
individual conscience-based beliefs and responses with outcomes that
serve the greater good by enhancing communal “equality and practical
liberty.”272 As in the case of free exercise claims, this is a determination
that we must trust to the courts if conscience is to be granted equivalence with religion.
V. CONCLUSION
The protection of religious belief and its free exercise have a long
history in the United States. The focus on RFRAs at the state level is but
the most recent chapter in this saga. Protection of beliefs rooted in
conscience often have been overlooked given their historical synonymy
with religion. Although lacking an equally long pedigree, responses
arising from secular-based conscience in discreet areas such as military
service, medicine, and capital punishment have been protected.
268. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 888 (holding that the undiluted application of the
compelling interest test would invalidate every regulation that did not protect “an interest
of the highest order” and “open the prospect of constitutionally required religious
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind”).
269. See id. at 879, 885 (noting that the creation of “a private right to ignore generally applicable law” would “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself,” invite
anarchy, and contradict “constitutional tradition and common sense”).
270. See, e.g., Durham, supra note 264, at 677 (accepting the balancing aspect of any
case involving a perceived clash between free exercise rights and governmental interests
but also noting that “the balancing occurs on scales that are at best metaphorical and that
lack any metric for quantifying what is being measured on a common scale”); Joseph
William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 1283, 1301 (1996) (contending that the balance between individual rights and the
public interest in the context of free exercise rights is not an outlier but rather is “in
accord with current settled values”).
271. See, e.g., Dhooge, supra note 31, at 363–64 (identifying public accommodation
statutes as area in which “morality determinations” are ill-advised and further contending
that “[p]ublic accommodation statutes by their nature are free from moral judgments.
All persons are permitted to access and enjoy public accommodations regardless of their
physical characteristics or beliefs. In permitting such access and enjoyment, these statutes
separate the issue of discrimination from moral or social acceptance”). See also Chapman,
supra note 249, at 1792 (advancing the same contentions with respect to “human rights”);
Curtis, supra note 259, at 176–77 (advancing the same contentions with respect to laws
prohibiting race and gender discrimination); West, supra note 208, at 604–08 (contending that conscience-based considerations may invite discriminatory results in certain
instances).
272. Curtis, supra note 259, at 180.
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Recent judicial decisions equating conscience and religion are
unsurprising given the close, sometimes overlapping, doctrinal relationship between these concepts. What is surprising is the potential for the
recognition of a broad-based right of conscience and accompanying
expanded protection beyond discreet areas. Although they are not
identical, considerations of fairness and respect for personhood nevertheless support similar legal status for conscience and religion.
There are tangible benefits arising from equal status. Equivalence
removes advantages for religious objectors who would otherwise escape
burdens or gain advantages unavailable to non-religious objectors.
Equivalent treatment also relieves courts of difficulties associated with
determinations regarding whether beliefs and associated actions are
religiously motivated and thereby worthy of protection, or secular and
thus subject to some lesser degree of protection if any. All beliefs,
whether religious or secular, would be protected. The free exercise of
these beliefs would be subject to the same limitations, and government
interference would be required to satisfy well-established and understood standards.
Potential problems associated with equivalence warrant a slow
approach with considerable care exercised to identify and address possible negative consequences. This article has addressed some of these
consequences. A cautious approach is appropriate given these consequences and that true equivalence requires the extension of conscience
rights to non-natural persons pursuant to the holding in Hobby Lobby.
Such an approach is further justified by the likelihood that, once established, equivalent protection of conscience-based objections is likely to
become a permanent part of the legal landscape.
Equivalent treatment of religion and conscience is appropriate in
an increasingly secular age. Careful and deliberate consideration is
necessary in order to dispel concerns about legitimizing bad faith
claims, constitutionalizing civil disobedience, interfering with government functions, and other deleterious consequences. Skillful management by legislatures and courts can foster equality without anarchy, and
a parade of progress rather than one of horribles.273

273. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 (listing challenges to compulsory military service,
the payment of taxes, health and safety regulations, compulsory vaccination requirements, drug laws, traffic laws, certain types of social welfare legislation, child labor laws,
prohibitions upon animal cruelty, environmental protection laws, and laws prohibiting
racial discrimination as part of a “parade of horribles” should the compelling interest
standard be applicable to all actions believed to be religiously commanded).

